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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly some European Union (“EU”) Member States are
undertaking practices to revoke or refuse nationality and thus EU
citizenship, yet some of these practices are unlawful. It does not seem
correct that a Member State’s unlawful act would have the result of
denying an individual EU citizenship, but in principle EU Member
States are the gatekeepers to EU citizenship. This Article will question
the impact of measures denying nationality on EU citizenship, and
conclude that, when an EU Member State unlawfully denies
nationality, the person can nonetheless still acquire EU citizenship.
Whether a person acquires the nationality of the state largely falls
within the discretion of the state, and international law plays little role.
This practice is true for both acquisition and withdrawal of nationality,
although those two processes have slightly different rules. In general,
the revocation of nationality is not prohibited by international law; 1
however, that general rule is increasingly subjected to several
exceptions.
This general rule is also applicable within the European Union.
The nationals of EU Member States acquire EU citizenship as an
automatic legal consequence of their nationality and their state’s
membership in the European Union. In line with the general rule, EU
Member States are free to set their nationality law within their own
discretion. This practice includes laws that significantly restrict the
acquisition of nationality and laws that aggressively revoke nationality.
For example, several Member States have exercised this discretion to
refuse nationality to Roma/Romani people,2 or to certain Latvia
“noncitizens,” 3 or revoke nationality from individuals who have joined

1. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (6th ed. 2003)
(“Existing practice and jurisprudence does not support a general rule that deprivation of
nationality is illegal”).
2. See Adam M. Warnke, Vagabonds, Tinkers, and Travelers: Statelessness Among the
East European Roma, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 335, 361 (1999).
3. See Dimitry Kochenov & Aleksejs Dimitrovs, EU Citizenship for Latvian
“Noncitizens”: A Concrete Proposal, 38 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 55, 55-56 (2016).
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the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). 4 The practice of acquiring
EU citizenship, being linked to the acquisition of Member State
nationality, has largely tolerated these consequential limitations on
acquiring EU citizenship.
However, international and European law continues to develop
and increasingly constrains state freedom in adopting domestic
nationality law. Regarding the revocation of Member State nationality,
EU law demands that the state consider the possibly disproportionate
consequential loss of EU citizenship. European human rights law limits
revocation for the impact that act has on other human rights, such as
freedom from discrimination and the right to one’s identity.
International law also restricts revocation of nationality when it results
in statelessness or constitutes an arbitrary or discriminatory act.
Regarding the refusal of Member State nationality acquisition, the
same sources also constrain state freedom. EU law and European
human rights law demand that such a refusal should not otherwise
infringe other human rights, and international law obliges states to
protect every person’s right to a nationality. In many ways, both
international and European law now make some revocations or refusals
of nationality unlawful.
If a denial of Member State nationality is indeed unlawful, then
the next question is whether such an unlawful act can have
consequences for EU citizenship. Under both international law and
European law, there are several remedies for an unlawful act. For
example, EU Member States must act in line with the duty of sincere
cooperation. Under international law, unlawful acts cannot create legal
rights. This article will argue that, when the denial of Member State
nationality is unlawful, other Member States and the Union itself may
nonetheless recognize EU citizenship.

4. See Megan Specia, ISIS Cases Raise a Question: What Does It Mean to Be Stateless?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/isisshamima-begum-citizenship-stateless.html [https://perma.cc/2V6D-GGRP] (reporting on the
denationalization of Shamima Begum by the United Kingdom); Joseph Nasr, Susan Fenton, &
Ed Osmond, Germany to Strip IS Fighters of Citizenship, REUTERS (March 3, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-justice-idUSKCN1QK0OH
[https://perma.cc/5Q7N-VG5S]. See Shamima Begum v Sec’y St. Home Dep’t, Appl. No.
SC/163/2019, Open Judgment (Spec. Immigr. Appls. Comm’n, UK, Feb. 7, 2020).
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II. ACQUISITION OF EU CITIZENSHIP
EU citizenship was created by the Treaty on European Union. 5 It
is additional to and does not replace nationality. 6 It provides a number
of rights for the individual directly from EU law, but more than merely
a description of various rights under European law, 7 EU citizenship has
come to be understood as the fundamental status of a person when
exercising rights under European law. 8 The acquisition of EU

5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 9, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J.
(C 326/13) (“Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship”) [hereinafter TEU];
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 20(1), Oct.
26, 2012, O.J. (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU], previously Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union & Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 17, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C
325/01) (“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional
to and not replace national citizenship”) [hereinafter TEC]; Directive 2004/38/EC, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,
O.J. (L 158/78).
6. See TEU, supra note 5, art. 9.
7. See Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office national de l’emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-6221.
8. See Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr.
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States, O.J. (L 158/78) 3, supra note 5; Case C-221/17,
Tjebbes et al. v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019 E.C.R. 4 (Mar. 12) [hereinafter Tjebbes
Case]; Case C-82/16, K.A. & Others, 2018 E.C.R. 47; Case C-165/14, Marín v. Admin del
Estado, 2016 E.C.R. 107; Case C-304/14, Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. CS, 2016 E.C.R.
3; Case C-359/13, Martens v. Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2015 E.C.R. 3;
Case C-523/11, 585/11, Prinz v. Region Hannover & Seeberger v. Studentenwerk Heidelberg,
2013 E.C.R. 3; Case C-256/11, Dereci et al v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2011 E.C.R. 62;
Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 43; Case C-50/06, Comm’n Eur. Cmtys. v.
Netherlands, 2007 E.C.R. 32; Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen & Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de
Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, 2006 E.C.R. 18; Case C-145/04, Spain v. U.K., 2006 E.C.R. 74;
Case C-209/03, Bidar v. Ealing, Sec’y State Educ. and Skills, 2005 E.C.R. 31; Case C-147/03,
Comm’n Eur. Cmtys. v. Austria, 2005 E.C.R. 45; Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt
München v, 2005 E.C.R. 15; Case C-224/02, Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen
Vakuutusyhtiö, 2004 E.C.R. 16; Case C-200/02, Zhu & Chen v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, 2004
E.C.R. 25; Case C-482/01, 493/01, Orfanopoulos v. Baden-Württemberg v. Oliveri, 2004 E.C.R.
65; Case C-148/02, Avello v. Belgium, 2003 E.C.R. 22; Case C-413/99, Baumbast & R v. Sec’y
State Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. 82; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office national de l’emploi, 2002
E.C.R. 28; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-laNeuve, 2001 E.C.R. 31; Case C-274/96, Criminal proceeding against Bickel & Franz, 1998
E.C.R. I-7660; Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. 59; Case C-53/81, Levin v.
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1039.
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citizenship, is more than simply rights, it is also creating a status of a
direct legal bond between the individual and the Union. 9
Notwithstanding its nature as a fundamental, independent status,10
it does have some degree of dependency on the nationality of an EU
Member State. 11 This dependency, however, is limited to the
acquisition of EU citizenship status. 12 An individual acquires EU
citizenship when he or she is “holding” the nationality of an EU
Member State. 13 EU law does not expressly state whether loss of EU
citizenship status is also dependent on loss of member state
nationality. 14 By implication, it could be understood that loss is also
dependent, though this has never been expressly confirmed.
Because the acquisition of EU citizenship is dependent on the
acquisition of member state nationality, Member States can exercise a
certain amount of discretion over whether an individual acquires it.15
Not only do Member States have a considerable degree of flexibility in
prescribing their nationality laws, 16 but Member States can also
determine which individuals are considered its nationals for purposes
of EU citizenship. 17 This latter concern is primarily an issue of persons
9. See William Thomas Worster, Brexit and the International Law Prohibitions on the
Loss of EU Citizenship, 15 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 341, 341 (2018).
10. See Dimitry Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the
Difficult Relationship Between Status and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 181 n.81 (2009).
11. See Case C-165/14, Marín v. Admin del Estado, supra note 8, at 6; Case C-304/14,
Sec’y State Home Dep’t v. CS, supra note 8, at 3; Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, supra
note 8, at 3; Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 352.
12. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 354.
13. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 20 (“Every person holding the nationality of a member
States shall be a citizen of the Union”).
14. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 354.
15. See Council Decision, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty
of European Union, Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, annex 1, 1992 O.J. (C 348/01)
1; Case C-369/90, Micheletti & Ors v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I4258, I-4262; Report from the Commission on the Citizenship of the Union, COM (1993) 702
final (Dec. 21, 1993) 2 (“wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference
is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the
nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the
Member State concerned.”) [hereinafter Micheletti Case]; Third Report from the Commission
on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2001) 506 final (Sept. 7 2001) 7 (“It is therefore worth
pointing out that: – it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions for acquiring and
losing the nationality of that state”).
16. See Rottmann v Bayern, supra note 8; Case C-192/99, The Queen v Sec’y St. Home
Dep’t ex parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. I-1252, I-1259 [hereinafter Kaur Case].
17. Final Act to Treaty on European Union, Declaration on Nationality of a Member State,
July 29, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 98. However, it is not entirely clear how much discretion Member
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connected to overseas territories who might have a slightly different
legal relationship to the metropolitan state within the state’s
constitutional order. 18 For example, Denmark has excluded the Faroe
Islands from the European Union, even though the islands are part of
the Kingdom of Denmark, and thus Faroe Islanders do not acquire EU
citizenship. 19 Similarly, the United Kingdom has identified certain
forms and categories of nationality under domestic law that do not
qualify for EU citizenship, even though the individual has some sort of
legal bond with that state. 20
III. LAWFULNESS OF REFUSING OR REVOKING NATIONALITY
The next section will discuss situations where revocation or
refusal to grant nationality is unlawful. International law largely leaves
states to implement their nationality laws in their own discretion and
does not interfere. For example, the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides that
“[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
nationals” and that “[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the
nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with

States have in this regard, see e.g. Akos G. Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations Attached
to the Single European Act, 23 COMMON MKT L. REV. 803, 807-12 (1986), although practice
suggests it is quite expansive.
18. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 355(5); see also Treaty amending, with regard to
Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities art. 3, Feb. 1, 1985, O.J. (L 29);
TEC, supra note 5, at arts. 182, 299(2)-(3), annex II; Reg 1612/68/EEC, of the Council of 15
Oct. 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 2;
Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. Coll. van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag,
2006 E.C.R. I-8060, I-8087.
19. See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 355(5)(a).
20. See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 355(5)(c); Note to the Government of the Italian Republic
Concerning a Declaration Replacing the Declaration on the Definition of the Term ‘National’
Made at the Time of Signature of the Treaty of Accession of 22 Jan. 1972, 31 Dec. 1982, UKTS
67 (1983). The United Kingdom excluded certain EU citizenship rights from UK nationals in
Jersey, Guernsey, and Man who are EU citizens, but do not have the right to free movement.
This was only possible because the exclusion was included in the EU treaties and those persons
never acquired the rights in the first place. It would be quite a different matter for the United
Kingdom to attempt to revoke those rights. See also Treaty of Accession to the European
Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, 1st U.K. Declaration, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. L 73/ 196; K.R. Simmonds,
The British Nationality Act 1981 and the Definition of the Term “National” for Community
Purposes, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 675, 676-78 (1984).
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the law of the State.” 21 However, prior to the 1930 Hague Convention,
the Permanent Court of International Justice had already opined that it
was certainly possible for international law to govern the rules of
nationality, and such limitations might arise in the future. 22 Thus by
1955, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) concluded that, where
there was no genuine connection between an individual and the state,
other states were not required to recognize the grant of nationality, 23
already providing one exception to the more absolute rule stated in the
Hague Convention. Later, the International Law Commission
concluded that limitations imposed by international law were well
established. 24 What had not so clearly appeared in international law at
this point was any obligation to grant nationality. That would come
later. This section will consider the most recent developments in
international law governing nationality, under both general
international law and EU law, and apply to cases of revocation or
refusal to grant nationality, in order to identify situations that may be
unlawful.
A.

Revocation of nationality

The first scenario of possible unlawful refusal of nationality
contemplated in this article is the revocation of nationality.
Historically, many states have claimed a right to revoke nationality and
send former nationals into exile. 25 As recently as 10 years ago, this
21. See, e.g., Hague Convention Governing Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationalities arts. 1-2, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
22. See Permanent Court of Int’l Just. (ser. B) Advisory Opinion No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7,
1923).
23. See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr. 6).
24. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/61/10, at 33-34 (2006) (states must comply with international law when granting their
nationality); Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-First
Session, (1999) (Vol. II)(2) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1
(same); Documents of the Forty-Ninth Session, (1997) (Vol. II)(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1997/Add.1 (same, specifically regarding human rights law).
25. See Alien Act of 1793, 33 Geo. 3, c. 4 (UK) (does not distinguish between aliens and
nationals); Penal Servitude Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 2 (UK) (abolishing transportation);
CHARLES DELESSERT, L’ETABLISSEMENT ET LE SEJOUR DES ETRANGERS AU POINT DE VU
JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE 52 (1924); H. LESSING, DAS RECHT DER STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT
UND DUE ABERKENNUNG DER STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT ZU STRAF-UND SICHERUNGSZWECKEN
113 (1937); Ernest Lehr, La Nationalité, in ERNEST LEHR, LES PRINCIPAUX ETATS DU GLOBE
16 (1909); Gerald R. Miller, Banishment–A Medieval Tactic in Modern Criminal Law, 5 UTAH
L. REV. 365, 365-66 (1957).
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practice had all but ended, 26 partly reflecting a revulsion against
practices resembling the Nazi Nuremberg Laws. 27 With the rise in
global terrorism, a number of countries have reasserted the right to
denationalize nationals who commit or provide aid to terrorist
organizations, or are considering adopting provisions to revoke
nationality. 28 Within the European Union, Belgium, 29 Denmark,30

26. See Chama L.C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Econ. & Soc. Council, (Special Rapporteur),
Analysis of the Current Trends and Developments Regarding the Right to Leave Any Country
Including One’s Own, and to Return to One’s Own Country, and Some Other Rights or
Considerations Arising Therefrom, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1988/35, paras. 48, 116, 119
(June 20, 1988).
27. See Gefek Uber Den Miberrui Von Ginburderungen Und Die Ubbertunnung Der
Deitinchen Graatsangehorigeit [Law Concerning Cancellation of Naturalizations and
Deprivation of Nationality], July 14, 1933, RGBL. I at 480 (Ger.) (revoking naturalizations,
primarily targeting Jews, between Nov. 9, 1918, and Jan. 30, 1933); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS,
MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INT’L L. & PRAC. 88-89 (1995); Megan Specia, ISIS Cases Raise
a Question: What Does It Mean to Be Stateless?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/isis-shamima-begum-citizenshipstateless.html [https://perma.cc/JB23-73GH].
28. See, e.g., Australia: R. Thwaites, New Laws Make Loss of Citizenship a CounterTerrorism Tool, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 11, 2015), http://theconversation.com/new-lawsmake-loss-of-citizenship-a-counter-terrorism-tool-51725 [https://perma.cc/7XF7-NY9W]; Fact
Check: How Does Australia’s Plan to Strip Foreign Rights of Citizenship Compare to Other
Nations?, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-0611/foreignfighters-citizenship-around-the-world/6498920 [https://perma.cc/B6NJ-9Q66]; An
Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts, c. 22
(Bill C-24) (Can.); Daiva Stasiulis, The Extraordinary Statelessness of Deepan Budlakoti: The
Erosion of Canadian Citizenship Through Citizenship Deprivation, 11 STUD. IN SOC. JUST. 1,
8 (2017); Simon Tomlinson, Norway Considers Revoking Citizenship of People Who Take Part
in Terror Activities or Wars Abroad – Echoing the Call of Boris Johnson, DAILY MAIL (Aug.
27, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2735498/Norway-considers-revokingcitizenship-people-terror-activities-wars-abroad-echoing-call-Boris-Johnson.html
[https://perma.cc/2SGP-5LFG].
29. See CODE PÉNAL [C.Pén.] [BELGIAN CRIMINAL CODE], art. 23/2 (Belg.); Grounds for
Concern: Belgium’s Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/03/groundsconcern/belgiums-counterterror-responses-paris-and-brussels-attacks#page
[https://perma.cc/2N42-AV3W].
30. See STRAFFELOVEN [DANISH CRIM. CODE], § 114 (Den.).
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France, 31 the Netherlands, 32 and the United Kingdom, 33 have adopted
provisions to revoke nationality when a national commits a terrorism
offense. Other EU states, such as Germany and Sweden, have also
considered similar measures. 34 This section will first examine whether
such practices would violate EU law, and secondly, whether they
would violate international law.
1. European regional law
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has ruled
directly on point that revocation of nationality by a member state of the
European Union may implicate EU law. In the Rottmann case, the
Court found that when a member state withdraws its nationality from
an individual, it must take into consideration the impact on EU
citizenship,35 and, in the Tjebbes case, the Court held that this
consideration must be an individualized assessment, not an automatic
operation of law. 36 While the CJEU fundamentally respected the power
of the member state to withdraw nationality, it suggested that a Member
31. See Kim Willsher, Hollande Drops Plan to Revoke Citizenship of Dual-National
Terrorists,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/francois-hollande-drops-plan-to-revokecitizenship-of-dual-national-terrorists [https://perma.cc/D75W-TNNY] (considering, and
rejecting, even more expansive denationalization measures for dual nationals from birth); Maïa
de la Baume, Court Upholds France’s Move to Strip Citizenship of Man Jailed on Terror
Charge,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
23,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/europe/amedy-coulibaly-paris-attacks-burial.html
[https://perma.cc/2VLU-UFTN] (only applying to naturalized nationals).
32. See Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap [Netherlands Nationality Act], art. 14(2)
(Neth.); see also Tjebbes Case, supra note 8.
33. See Victoria Parsons, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, Theresa May
deprived 33 Individuals of British Citizenship in 2015 (June 21, 2016),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2016-06-21/citizenship-stripping-new-figuresreveal-theresa-may-has-deprived-33-individuals-of-british-citizenship
[https://perma.cc/M7VL-P9AR].
34. See, e.g., Germany Plans to Strip Passports of Fighters with 2nd Nationality, AL
JAZEERA (Mar 4, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/germany-plans-strippassports-fighters-2nd-nationality-190304182914343.html
[https://perma.cc/J5ST-268K];
Justin Huggler, Dual Nationals Who Fight for Terror Groups to be Stripped of German
Citizenship, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 11, 2016); Arthur Lyons, Swedish Prime Minister Refuses to
Strip Citizenship: “ISIS Fighters Can Return,” VOICE EUR. (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://voiceofeurope.com/2019/03/swedish-prime-minister-refuses-to-strip-citizenship-isisfighters-can-return/ [https://perma.cc/T3CP-N953].
35. See Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8.
36. See Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, paras. 9-10.
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State was not entirely free to act as it wished in regards to domestic
nationality law. 37
What remains still unclear from Rottmann and Tjebbes is whether
the Court would ever find a withdrawal of nationality so significant for
EU citizenship that it would find the withdrawal unlawful. We might
consider, for example, a case of withdrawal of nationality as the direct
result of the exercise of EU citizenship rights, such as a withdrawal of
nationality due to extended time resident abroad relying on the right to
free movement. 38 It is difficult to see how such a revocation would be
lawful under EU law, though it does stretch Rottmann and Tjebbes
quite far. Surely the CJEU would not permit a state to revoke an
individual’s nationality when he or she simply exercised their rights
under EU law. Another more difficult scenario might be revocation of
nationality as punishment for the distasteful exercise of free speech or
some other fundamental right. Again, it seems wrong at first glance,
though identifying the precise legal basis is more challenging.
Unfortunately, the CJEU has not given us more guidance on whether
acts would ever rise to the level that the court would adjudge the act a
violation of EU law, and, in fact, Tjebbes suggests that this bar is quite
high.
One other important implication comes out of Rottmann and
Tjebbes for EU citizenship: they reaffirm that EU citizenship is a
separate and independent status from member state nationality. If EU
citizenship was entirely dependent on and derivative from member
state nationality, then EU citizenship should not be a distinct issue from
the withdrawal of member state nationality. It should not call for a
separate consideration under EU law. Since the CJEU concluded that
these cases do call for a distinct consideration as to EU citizenship, then
we must conclude that the Court conceives of EU citizenship as having
its own distinct rights and nature. 39 Of course, this judgment only
37. See Dimitry Kochenov, A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A
Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55, 77 (2011).
38. See Case C-221/17, Tjebbes Case, supra note 8 (explicitly excluding such a scenario
from consideration, though implying that such a scenario would raise significantly distinct
considerations); Dimitry Kochenov, supra note 10, at 191 (citing Nicholas Sitaropoulos,
Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of ex Art.
19 of the Greek Nationality Code, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 205, 205 (2004).
39. See Dimitry Kochenov, supra note 37, at 76; see generally Worster, Brexit, supra note
9 (2018) (arguing that Brexit revocation of EU citizenship without revocation of Member State
nationality is problematic).
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reaffirms the view on the independence of EU citizenship that was
expressed in the earlier cases. 40
We should probably not make too big a point of emphasizing that
EU law protects EU citizenship, because the Court of Justice in
Rottmann and Tjebbes only emphasized that the Member State must
take EU law into consideration. In the actual aftermath of Rottmann,
Germany reacted to the Court’s judgment by affirming Rottmann’s loss
of nationality, following consideration of the impact on EU
citizenship. 41 In Tjebbes, the Court ordered an individualized
assessment, though it upheld the right of the Netherlands to revoke
nationality due to the mere failure to renew a passport. 42 And it is
unclear what criteria any individualized consideration would need to
include and evaluate. 43 The EU legal protection of EU citizenship
seems to be quite weak.
In any event, it appears that EU law does have some notional
limitation, albeit vague and persuasive, on the ability of Member States
to withdraw their nationality with consequences for EU citizenship.
While we do not yet know the precise parameters of those limitations
from EU law, 44 it is certainly conceivable that an abusive, punitive,
perhaps arbitrary, revocation of nationality, with consequences for EU
citizenship, might run afoul of EU law. To date no Member State has
ever attempted to withdraw member state nationality without also
withdrawing EU citizenship. Perhaps those legal gymnastics will come
in time, 45 although if the individual still retained EU citizenship, then
40. See Micheletti Case, supra note 15 (refusing to permit a Member State to apply its own
nationality laws, following Nottebohm’s genuine link, to an individual holding nationalities of
both a Member State and a non-Member State); Nottebohm Case, supra note 23, at 23; see also
Zhu & Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, supra note 8; Case C-136/78, Ministère
Public v. Vincent Auer, E.C.R. 1979 450. Cf. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office national de
l’emploi, E.C.R. 2011 I-1251 (although not discussing the interference with enjoyment of EU
citizenship, the Court held a similar standard for interference with the enjoyment of EU
citizenship rights).
41. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE] [Supreme Administrative Court], Nov. 11,
2010, 5 C 12.10 (F.R.G.).
42. See Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, para. 44.
43. See id.
44. See Andrew C. Evans, Nationality Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the EEC:
With Special Reference to the British Nationality Act 1981, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 173, 189 (1982)
(arguing duty of loyalty limits discretion).
45. Note that this idea is not entirely excluded. A provision to make it impossible to sever
Member State nationality and EU citizenship was proposed and rejected. See Draft Treaty
Establishing the European Union 1984 O.J. (C 77) art. 3 (“The citizens of the Member States
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it will be difficult for the member state to resist giving the individual
admission and residence.
In addition, to EU law protecting EU citizenship, EU law also
protects other rights that may be implicated by a withdrawal of
nationality. The EU legal order includes the Charter of Fundamental
Rights as a binding obligation. 46 By its terms, the charter does not
explicitly protect a right to nationality or EU citizenship. However, it
does prohibit EU Member States from imposing measures based on
“any discrimination,” including race, ethnicity, social origin, genetic
features, and others. 47 While it has not been adjudicated on point, there
is no good reason to believe that this provision would not apply to
nationality legislation. Following on the argument above, it should not
be lawful for an EU Member State to revoke nationality as a
consequence of the exercise of Charter rights, or revoke nationality that
might have an unjustified impact on the enjoyment of Charter rights.
The above paragraphs discussed EU law and while the European
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) is not an EU instrument, the
protections within the Convention are binding on their own before the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and are relevant in
interpreting protections of EU law under the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. The Convention does not expressly protect the right to acquire
or retain a nationality. 48 The one exception to this failure to intervene
in nationality matters is Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR which prohibits
states from withdrawing nationality merely as a pretext to expulsion.49
However, the revocation of nationality can be reviewed by the ECtHR

shall ipso facto be citizens of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be dependent upon
citizenship of a Member State; it may not be independently acquired or forfeited.”).
46. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. (C 364) 1 (Dec. 18,
2000).
47. See id. at art. 21.
48. See Makuc v. Slovn., Appl. No. 26828/06, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility,
para. 160, Eur. Ct. H. R., 3d Sec., (May 31, 2007); Poenaru v. Rom., Appl. No. 51864/99,
Decision as to the Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H. R., (Nov. 13, 2001); Karassev v. Finland, App. No.
31414/96, Decision (Final) as to the Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H. R., 4th Sec., (Jan. 12, 1999);
Family K. & W. v. Neth., App. No. 11278/84, Decision. at 216 Eur Comm’n H. R., July 1, 1985;
X. v. Aust., App. No. 5212/71 Eur. Comm’n H. R., Oct. 5, 1972.
49. See Protocol No. 4 to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already
Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto, Sep. 16, 1963, Eur. Treaty Series
4; Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4, para. 23.
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when it impacts other rights that are in the convention, 50 for example,
Article 8, the right to private and family life. 51 The Court analyzes a
violation of Article 8 by examining whether the nationality revocation
was arbitrary and the consequences of the revocation. 52 Arbitrariness
is tested by whether the measure is provided in law, 53 and whether there
are procedural safeguards, both the possibility of judicial review54 and
diligent action by the authorities. 55 As a consequence, the ECtHR
considers whether the individual is rendered stateless. 56 Following
these criteria, the Court has in the past found nationality revocation to
have been permissible, 57 although cases may arise in the future that will
constitute a violation of Article 8. Other claims for violations have
included Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), and Article 4 of
Protocol No. 7 (ne bis in idem). 58
In addition to the ECHR, another convention under the auspices
of the Council of Europe governs nationality issues: the European
Convention on Nationality (ECN). 59 It provides that everyone has a
right to a nationality. 60 Unfortunately it does not widespread adherence,
but if a member state who was party to the Convention withdrew
50. See Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48; Kafkasli v. Turk., Appl. No. 21106/92,
Judgment (1995); Salahddin Galip v. Greece, Appl. No. 17309/90, Judgment (1995).
51. See K2 v U.K., Appl. No. 42387/13, Decision. on the Admissibility, para. 49 (2017);
Ramadan v. Malta, Appl. No. 76136/12, Judgment, para. 85 (2016); Genovese v. Malta, Appl.
No. 53124/09, paras. 30, Eur. Ct. H. R., (Oct. 11, 2011); Savoia & Bounegru v. It., App. No.
8407/05, Decision (2006); Slivenko v. Lat., App. No. 48321/99, Decision, para. 77 (2002);
Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48.
52. See K2 v. U.K., supra note 51.
53. See id. para. 50.
54. See id. at para. 55.
55. See id. at para. 50; Ramadan v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 86-89.
56. See K2 v. U.K., supra note 51, para. 62.
57. See id.
58. See Protocol No. 7 to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already
Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, Sep. 16, 1963, Eur. Treaty Series
117; Council of Eur., Parliamentary. Assembly, Resolution 2263 (2019) (Prov. ver.);
Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human Rights-Compatible
Approach?,
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25430
[https://perma.cc/L9MJ-ALWQ]; see also Council of Eur., Parliamentary Assembly,
Committee on Legal Aff. and Hum. Rts, Tineke Strik, Rapporteur, Report, Doc. 14790,
Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human Rights-Compatible
Approach?
(2019),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetailsen.asp?FileID=25241&lang=en [https://perma.cc/SND5-N68W].
59. See European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166.
60. See id.
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nationality contrary to its terms, then that withdrawal would be
unlawful, for example, if revocation of nationality was only permitted
for naturalized citizens. 61
2. International law
International law also imposes some limitations on the ability of
a state to revoke nationality. These limitations fall into several broad
categories of statelessness, arbitrariness, and other miscellaneous
obligations. International law, of course, binds the EU Member States.
However, the European Commission has argued that, part of having
due regard to Union law means having “due regard” to international
law, 62 suggesting that compliance with international law on nationality
was additionally obliged by EU law.
a. Statelessness
Statelessness obligations primarily arise under treaty law. 63 States
that are party to the 1961 Statelessness Convention are under an
obligation to prevent statelessness and reduce the number of cases of
61. See id. art. 5.2; Council of Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution. 2263 (2019)
(Prov. ver.), Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human RightsCompatible Approach?, available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLEN.asp?fileid=25430 [https://perma.cc/ZA47-E447].
62. See Case C-4/73, Nold Kohlen-und Baustoffgrobhandlung v. KG Comm’n Eur.
Comm’ties, 1974 E.C.R. 492; Case C-181/73 Haegeman v Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 450, para. 5;
Case C-104/81 Kupferberg v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1982 E.C.R. 3644, para. 12; Case C-286/90,
Anklagemindigheden v. Poulsen & Diva Navigation, 1992 E.C.R. I-6048, paras. 9-10; Case C162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-3688, paras. 45-46; Case C-308/06, Queen
on the App. of Int’l Assoc. of Indep. Taker Owners (Intertanko), et al. v. Sec’y St. Trans.,
Judgment, 2008 E.C.R., para. 38; Rottmannn v Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 28-29; Case C366/10, Air Transp. Assoc. Am. And Ors v Sec’y St. Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I13833, paras. 73, 101 [hereinafter Air Transp. Case]; European Commission, Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eur. Econ. and Soc. Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, at 5, COM (2019) 12 final (2019) (“Having due regard to EU law
means taking into account all rules forming part of the Union legal order and includes having
due regard to norms and customs under international law as such norms and customs form part
of EU law”).
63. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 8, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S.
175 (hereinafter 1961 Statelessness Convention). Certainly this limitation applies to states party
to the 1961 Statelessness Convention, but might also apply to states generally under customary
international law. This author has argued elsewhere that such a rule applies under customary
international law, but that argument will be omitted here because it is not necessary for the
conclusions herein however, on this point see European Court of Human Rights, Kuric & Ors v.
Slovenia, App. No. 26828/06, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2010).
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statelessness. 64 As of 2019, EU Member States that are party to the
1961 Statelessness Convention include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
constituting the majority of the Member States. In addition, the
European Union has itself pledged that all the states in the Union would
adhere to the 1961 Statelessness Convention in the future,65 and the
CJEU has stated that the creation of statelessness by withdrawing
nationality would not be a legitimate revocation of Member State
nationality. 66
There are a few exceptions to the prohibition on creating stateless.
Necessarily, individuals with multiple nationalities may have their
nationality removed without a violation of the statelessness rule. 67 The
convention itself provides that stateless may nonetheless be created in
situations of (1) residence abroad seven or more years without
declaration of intent to retain nationality; 68 (2) taking up residence in
the state for at least one year after attaining majority age, when born
abroad; 69 (3) fraud or misrepresentation in naturalization process; 70 and
(4) situations where the state has entered a reservation to the treaties
for cases of loyalty, oaths, or services to foreign states, or acts
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.” 71

64. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, arts. 7(3), 8(1); see also Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nat’lity Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, League of Nations
Doc. C.224.M.111.1930.V (1930); League of Nations, Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of
Statelessness, 12 April 1930, No. 4138. 179 L.N.T.S 115; Special Protocol Concerning
Statelessness, League of Nations Doc. C.227.M.114, 1930 V (not yet entered into force).
65. See Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Statelessness (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5829c53a4.html [https://perma.cc/manage/create].
66. See, Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, para. 37. But see Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8
(where the revocation of nationality would have rendered the applicant stateless).
67. See generally William Thomas Worster, International Law and the Expulsion of
Individual with More than One Nationality, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF’RS 423 (2009).
68. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, arts. 7(4), 8(2)(a).
69. See id. para. 7(5), 8(2)(a).
70. See id. para. 8(2)(b).
71. See id. para. 8(3).
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Some EU Member States have taken advantage of this option and
entered a reservation. For example, the United Kingdom
communicated the following to the depositary: 72
“[The UK declares that it] retains the right to deprive a naturalised
person of his nationality on the following grounds . . . that,
inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to Her Britannic Majesty,
the person (i) Has . . . rendered or continued to render services to,
or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another
State, or (ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of Her Britannic Majesty.”

Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, and Spain
have entered similar reservations, 73 leaving only Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden without the
exception (4) above, but still retaining exceptions (1) through (3).
All of the above means that an EU Member State may not, in
principle, revoke the nationality of a person with only one nationality.
The only exceptions would be when the individual has committed fraud
in the naturalization process, has maintained extended residence
aboard, or has never taken up residence in the state after being born
abroad. In addition, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
Spain and the United Kingdom have the additional exception that they
may also revoke nationality when the individual has acted in a manner
that is “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.” 74
b. Arbitrary or discriminatory measures
Beyond these treaty provisions expressly covering statelessness,
a number of other human rights treaties, in fact most other human right
treaties provide for a right to a nationality. 75 These treaties however,
72. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. V(4), Reservation Upon Ratification (Mar. 9, 1966),
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V4&chapter=5&lang=en#EndDec [https://perma.cc/5FSX-LMAU].
73. See id.
74. See id. art. 3(a)(ii).
75. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law art.
1, Apr. 13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S 89; Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, Apr. 12,
1930, 179 L.N.T.S 115; G.A. Res. 1040, Convention on the Nationality of Married Women,
paras. 1-3 (Jan. 29, 1957) [hereinafter CNMW]; G.A. Res. 61/177, Int’l Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 25(4) (2007); Int’l Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(d)(iii), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
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contain several weaknesses, leaving states some discretion to revoke
nationality lawfully. That being said, states are not completely free to
revoke nationality when that revocation would be arbitrary.
The obligation to ensure that every person enjoys a nationality has
two significant weaknesses. The first weakness is that it only requires
that an individual have “a” nationality, but does not clearly identify the
state that must extend nationality. 76 However, for the instant question,
when an individual has only one nationality, a state that revokes that
nationality is creating a stateless person, and thus the state is clearly
violating the individual’s right to a nationality. Prior to the revocation
the individual had a nationality, and following the revocation, the
individual does not have a nationality, due to the deliberate action of
the state.
The second weakness is that states may deprive individuals of
their nationality under these human rights treaties, provided they do not
act arbitrarily. 77 The CJEU has recognized the restriction on arbitrary
revocation of nationality as a “general principle of international law.”78
Arbitrariness has been interpreted as having two meanings: procedural
arbitrariness and substantive arbitrariness. 79 Procedural arbitrariness
results from a state acting without a legal basis for doing so, 80 or not
195 [hereinafter CERD]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24(3), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women art. 9, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; Int’l Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families art. 29, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CPMW”];
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Also see G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
76. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3) (“Every child has the right to acquire a
nationality”); UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1).
77. See U.N. Secretary-General, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Report of the
Secretary-General, para. 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Arbitrary
Deprivation of Nationality].
78. See Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8.
79. See Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11,762, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Report
No. 20/98, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.95, doc. 5 rev para. 95 (2001); Arbitrary Deprivation of
Nationality, supra note 73; Human Rights Council, UN Secretary-General & UNHCHR,
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality (Jan. 26, 2009), para. 61 et seq.; U.N. Secretary-General,
Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, para. 40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/34 (Dec.
14, 2009) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2009].
80. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (“ELSI”) (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 128 (July 20);
see also Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
20/98, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 5 rev para. 95 (2001); Eri. v. Eth., Claims Comm’n, Partial
Award: Civilian Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 44 I.L.M. 601, paras. 57-78 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004);
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providing for effective legal process. 81 While this possibility may be
implicated in cases of nationality revocation, it is not necessarily
relevant, so we will not discuss it any further.
Substantive arbitrariness, however, is very relevant. Substantive
arbitrariness is linked to the notion that laws must be proportionate to
their legitimate objectives. 82 For example, some actions are almost
always considered substantively arbitrary, most importantly,
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc. 83 Where
revocation of nationality is motivated by discrimination on protected
grounds, then the revocation will be unlawful. 84 One ground of
Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe 166, 36
(1997) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/166.htm [https://perma.cc/BH9AHNCU] (providing that denaturalization “must in general be foreseeable, proportional and
prescribed by law”) [hereinafter Explanatory Report: Nationality].
81. See U.N., Hum. Rts. Committee, No 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) [hereinafter “Freedom of Movement”]; U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Hum. Rts. and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, paras. 43-46, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rts. and Arbitrary Deprivation
of Nationality, para. 40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013); Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft
Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States, with
commentaries, U.N. Doc A/54/10, at 38 (1999).
82. See ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 26; see also Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (“ELSI”) (U.S.
v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 128 (July 20); Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J.
284 (“Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to
the rule of law”); Freedom of Movement, supra note 81, para. 21; Van Alphen v. Neth., Hum.
Rts. Comm., No. 305/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, 5 (1990); A v Aust’lia, Hum.
Rts. Comm., No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, 9 (1997); Stewart v. Can., Hum.
Rts. Comm., No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996), (Evatt & Medina
Quiroga, Indiv. Op.; Aguilar Urbina, Dissent, para. 8); Eri. v. Eth., Claims Comm’n, Partial
Award: Civilian Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 44 I.L.M. 601 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), 44 I.L.M 601 (Eri.
Award), paras. 57-78.
83. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 65, art. 9; CERD, supra
note 75; CEDAW supra note 71, art. 9(1); G.A. Res., Draft International Declaration of Human
Rights, E/800, UN Doc A/C.3/SR.123, 352 (Nov. 5, 1948) (Eleanor Roosevelt: “individuals
should not be subjected to action such as was taken during the Nazi regime in Germany when
thousands had been stripped of their nationality by arbitrary government action”); G.A. Res.
10/13 para. 2-3 (March 26, 2009); H.R.C. Res. 20/5, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/20/5, at 2-4 (July
16, 2012); H.R.C. Res.7/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/20/5, at 2-3; International Law Commission,
Draft Articles Nationality in relation to the Succession of States, art. 15 (prohibiting
discrimination “on any ground”).
84. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(2); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CERD, supra
note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 18, G.A. Res.
61/106, 76th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]; see also
European Convention on Nationality, supra note 76, arts. 3(2), 5(1); Karassev v. Finland, supra
note 48; Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Dev. in Africa (“IHRDA”) and Open Soc. Just. Initiative on
Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v. The Gov’t of Kenya. No. Com/002/2009,
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prohibited discrimination is specifically important in this case and that
is discrimination between nationals based on whether they acquired
their nationality by birth or by subsequent naturalization. 85
Other cases not involving prohibited discrimination are tested for
proportionality, meaning that the objective of the revocation must be
legitimate and the measures taken must be tailored to the objective. The
Human Rights Council, UN Secretary-General and UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) have concluded that that
revocation of nationality resulting in statelessness is necessarily
substantively arbitrary. 86 Setting aside the creation of statelessness,
other views help inform us of when revocation would be proportionate.
The Human Rights Committee has concluded in General Comment No.
27 that states may not revoke nationality merely as a means to expel a
person and that there are “few, if any, circumstances in which
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be
reasonable.” 87 The ECN takes a slightly more liberal position,
suggesting which cases might fall in this limited exception, by
providing for several cases that will not be considered substantively
arbitrary. Those cases are limited to: voluntary acquisition of another
nationality; acquisition of the nationality by fraud or deception;
voluntary service in a foreign military force; conduct seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of the state; lack of a genuine link
African Committee of Experts on the Rts. and Welfare of the Child, para. 57 (March 22, 2011);
Case of Girls Yean & Bosico v. Dom. Rep., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) paras. 136, 139, 141 (Sept. 8, 2005); Expelled Dominicans & Haitians v. Dom.
Rep., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 263 (Aug. 28, 2014);
H.R. Council, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar,
paras. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/23/L.9 (Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Myanmar
Report]; H.R. Council, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review:
Austria, paras. 5.4, 5.5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/23/L.20 (Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Austria
Report]; Hum. Rts and Arbitrary Deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34, art. 4 (Dec. 14, 2009); Dimitry Kochenov, EU Influence on the
Citizenship Policies of the Candidate Countries: The Case of the Roma Exclusion in the Czech
Republic, 3 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 124 (2007).
85. See Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human RightsCompatible Approach EUR., PARL. ASS., RES. 2263 (2019); see also Withdrawing Nationality
as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human Rights-Compatible Approach?, EUR., PARL. ASS.
Doc. 14790 (2019).
86. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 8; Arbitrary Deprivation Report
2009, supra note 79; European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, art. 7(3).
87. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
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between the state and a national habitually residing abroad; or failure
of a child to fulfill preconditions established by law. 88 All other
grounds are unreasonable. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission
agreed with this approach in part when it held that withdrawal of
nationality was proportionate in cases where when the person presents
a serious security risk or holds another nationality. 89
c. Other issues
In addition to the major issues of statelessness and the right to a
nationality, there are several other obligations that states may violate
when they revoke nationality, rending the revocation unlawful. Two
examples will be briefly mentioned here: rights of the child and
obligations for international criminal justice.
First, all Member States of the European Union are parties to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). The Convention
requires states to consider the best interests of the child in all decisions
pertaining to children, 90 and especially for those rights enumerated in
the CRC, specifically, such as the right to a nationality. If a state
proposes to revoke a child’s nationality, either alone or in conjunction
with the revocation of the parent’s nationality, that decision must be
motivated by being in the best interests of the child. 91 However,
numerous bodies have expressed the view that becoming stateless is
never in the best interests of a child. 92 The only way to overcome this
obligation would be a very strong showing that having the nationality
of an EU Member State (and potentially having EU citizenship) was
not in the child’s interests, and it is difficult to understand how a child
would be better off with that result.
88. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, arts. 5(1), 7(3).
89. See Eri. v. Eth., supra note 76, at paras. 57-78.
90. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sep. 2, 1990 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
91. See U.N. Secretary-General, Status of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, U.N.
Doc. A/68/257 (Aug. 2, 2013), para. 57 et seq.
92. See CRC, supra note 90, art. 3; Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comm. 17, para. 8, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1989); CRC, Comm. Rts. Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4 (Aug 4,
2011); U.N.H.C.R., Guidelines on Statelessness, No. 4, para. 11, HCR/GS/12/04 (Dec. 21,
2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, art. 4,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec.13, 2013) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2013]; Ofc.
High Comm’r Hum. Rts., The Rights of the Child, Fact Sheet No.10 (Rev.1) (1997). Afr. Comm.
Children, Gen. Comm. 2, ACERWC/GC/02 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“being stateless as a child is
generally an antithesis to the best interests of children”).
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Secondly, abolishing the link of nationality may violate the
Member State’s obligations to cooperate in prosecuting international
crimes. All EU Member States are parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The Court acquires
complementary jurisdiction over individuals who they either commit
crimes within the territories of states parties to the Rome Statute or
simply have the nationality of a state party to the Rome Statute and
commit crimes anywhere. 93 Setting aside crimes that are committed in
states parties, it may be that the only way that the Court has jurisdiction
over certain persons is due to them holding the nationality of an EU
Member State. If that nationality is withdrawn, then the Court’s
jurisdiction is abolished. The Rome Statute obliges states to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over individuals responsible for international
crimes when they have it, 94 and to cooperate with the ICC in
investigation and prosecution. 95 It is certainly arguable that by
withdrawing the nationality of nationals who may have committed
international crimes (e.g. through association with ISIS), the EU
Member State is terminating the jurisdiction of the ICC over these
persons, and not cooperating with the potential prosecution of persons
by the Court. 96 Similarly, the UN Security Council in Resolution 2178
has ordered all states to cooperate in combating terrorism, including
exercising controls over their nationals. By revoking nationality, the
Member State would be unilaterally renouncing its ability to exercise
certain controls, and, again, might be refusing to cooperate with the

93. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (“2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred . . . (b) The State of which the
person accused of the crime is a national”) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
94. See id. at preamble (“The States Parties to this Statute, . . . Recalling that it is the duty
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes . . .”).
95. See id. art. 86, (“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute,
cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court”).
96. The EU Member States would still retain jurisdiction over the person and crimes,
should the person appear in the state’s jurisdiction, under the concept of universal jurisdiction
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. But by terminating nationality, the claim
of active nationality jurisdiction by the state is also foregone.
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Security Council’s order. Certainly the Council of Europe believes this
to be the case. 97
B.

Refusal of nationality

Having discussed the possibilities when the revocation of
nationality would be unlawful, we now turn to the unlawful refusal to
grant nationality. In some ways the refusal to grant nationality is a
harder case to make as an unlawful act. After all, revocation of
nationality brings up a sense of loss of acquired rights, whereas refusal
to grant nationality denies the person from acquiring more rights. At
first glance, states appear to have rather unfettered discretion in
determining who acquires their nationality as an inherent aspect of
sovereignty. Certainly, they appear to have considerable freedom in
establishing which kinds of links are sufficient to create the necessary
bond between the individual and the state. While that distinction
between loss and acquisition of nationality is important, in some ways
refusal to grant nationality is perhaps better protected, at least for
certain situations, such as children born stateless. We will examine
these situations under European regional law and general international
law.
1. European regional law
EU law imposes some protections from revocation of nationality
on Member States, but it is significantly less protective in cases of
refusal of nationality. Quite simply, without acquiring nationality, and
thus EU citizenship, EU law does not apply. While EU law on the
protection from refusal of EU citizenship is less demanding than in
cases of revocation, the Charter rights do still apply to all persons in
the European Union, regardless of nationality. As such, EU Member
States should not be able to refuse nationality where this refusal is

97. See U.N.S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014); Resolution Withdrawing Nationality as a
Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human Rights-Compatible Approach, EUR. PARL. DOC. No.
2263 (2019), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLEN.asp?fileid=25430 [https://perma.cc/2YTD-SWQ3]; see also Council of Europe, Tineke
Rapp, Rapporteur, Report, Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a
Human
Rights-Compatible
Approach?,
Doc.
14790
(2019)
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25430
[https://perma.cc/F7BH-B4XL].
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imposed as a consequence of the exercise of Charter rights or where
the refusal would impact Charter rights.
Similarly, the ECtHR has ruled that the refusal to grant nationality
can impact the enjoyment of rights under the ECHR. As noted above,
the ECHR does not provide for a right to acquire a nationality. 98 Once
again, claims of that nature need to be articulated instead as claims for
violations of other rights under the Convention, for example, the refusal
of nationality might amount to a degrading treatment, contrary to
Article 3. 99 One difficulty is that it is unclear whether refusal of
nationality can amount to an infringement of rights in the ECHR. For
example, a claim under whether refusal of nationality can amount to an
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) regarding the failure of the national
authority to process a naturalization application was not successful.100
Also unsuccessful was a claim that the refusal of nationality infringed
the right to private life. 101
However, one situation where refusal of nationality has been
found to amount to an ECHR violation is when refusal violates the right
to social identity. In Mennonson, France refused to grant nationality to
children conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), because such
practice was contrary to French law. The Court disagreed that refusal
of nationality was the correct result for children conceived through
IVF. While it is within the authority of the French State to prohibit IVF,
it was a violation of the right to social identity to refuse nationality to
children born of French parents as a result. 102 Similarly, the Court
found that it was a violation of the right to social identity to refuse
nationality in cases of state succession, where the individual should
98. See Makuc v. Slovn., supra note 48; Poenaru v. Rom., supra note 48; Karassev v.
Finland, supra note 48; Family K. & W. v. Neths, supra note 48; X. v. Austria, Appl. No.
5212/71 Eur. Comm’n Human Rts., (Oct. 5, 1972).
99. See Slepcik v. Neth. & Czech Rep., Appl. No. 30913/96, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts.,
(September 2, 1996) (referring to E. Afr. Asians v. UK., Appl. Nos. 4403-19/70, 4422-23/70,
4434/70, 4443/70, 4476-78/70, 4486/70, 4501/70, 4526-30/70, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts., (Dec.
14, 1973); Zeibek v Gr., Appl. No. 34372/97, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts., (May 21, 1997).
100. See Laura van Waas, Fighting Statelessness and Discriminatory Nationality Laws in
Europe, 14 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 243-60 (2014).
101. See Family K & W v. Neths., supra note 48 (“the right to acquire particular
nationality is neither covered by, nor sufficiently relate to, [article 8 in conjunction with article
14] or any other provision of the convention”).
102. See Genovese v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 30-33; Mennesson v. Fr., Appl. No.
65192/11), Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts (June 26, 2014); Labassee v. Fr., Appl. No. 65941/11, Eur. Ct.
Hum. Rts (June 26, 2014).
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have acquired the nationality of the new state, now sovereign over the
area of the person’s habitual residence. 103
One important consideration that makes the violation especially
compelling is whether the refusal of nationality concerns a child who
is born in the state and would be otherwise stateless. At least in a
dissenting opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque argued that the ECHR
obliges states to grant nationality to children born in their territories
who would otherwise be stateless. 104 While this view on protection
under the ECHR might still be a minority opinion, the ECN expressly
protects the acquisition of nationality specifically. In the ECN,
everyone is granted a right to a nationality, which means, inter alia,
that states must grant nationality to a child at birth when either parent
is a national and a child is born in the state or where the child would be
otherwise stateless. 105 A similar provision is made in cases of state
succession in the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
relation to State Succession. 106 Thus, if a Member State is a party to the
ECN, then the protection against nationality refusal leading to
statelessness is more certain than if the Member State is only party to
the ECHR.
2. International law
In the section above, discussing the revocation of nationality, we
already discussed a number of arguments where international law
protected a person’s nationality. The primary two protections are the
protection against statelessness and the protection of a right to “a”
nationality (i.e., non-arbitrary revocation). However, the refusal to
grant a nationality is a slightly different scenario than revocation. When
103. See Fedorova v. Latvia, Appl. No. 69405/01, Dec., Eur. Ct. H. R., (Oct. 9, 2003).
104. See Ramadan v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 86-89; Kuric & Others v. Slovenia,
Appl. No. 26828/06, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts, (July 13, 2010).
105. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, art. 6; Arbitrary Deprivation
Report 2013, supra note 92, art. 4.
106. See Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession
art. 10, May 19, 2006, Eur. Treaty Series No. 200; Eur. Comm’n for Democracy through Law
at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice Commission Declaration on the Consequences of State
Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons: Declaration on the Consequences of State
Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons, 13-14 (Sept. 1996); Council of Europe,
Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession, Explanatory
Report, art. 2, available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/200.htm
[https://perma.cc/54BC-DXXJ].

2020]

EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP

791

it comes to the grant of nationality, this act is usually based on one of
two situations: birth or naturalization. Although a few other highly
unusual options also exist, this paper will focus only on birth or
naturalization. Similar concerns exist for refusal of nationality as did
for revocation of nationality, when it pertains to the rights of the child
and the child’s best interests. 107 However, in this section, we will focus
on the refusal of nationality at birth and by naturalization.
a. Nationality at birth
The protection against statelessness coves the refusal to grant
nationality at birth. 108 Recall that the 1961 Statelessness Convention
prohibited denationalization of a person unless the grounds fell within
a short list of permissible reasons for the revocation. However, none of
the exceptions apply to the refusal of acquisition of nationality at birth;
they all address the revocation of nationality already acquired.
International law will oblige a state to grant nationality in the rare
situation that a child would be stateless. This Author has written
previously that, under customary international law, we must interpret
the right to a nationality, 109 and the protections against statelessness, to
mean that a child born in a state will receive the nationality of that state
if the child would otherwise be stateless. 110 This author reaffirms this
finding, but for purposes of this Article, we will not explore that line of
argument further.
Treaty law also imposes a similar obligation as customary
international law, though only where the EU Member States are parties
to the treaties. The 1961 Statelessness Convention commands that a
107. See infra Sec. III.A.2.iii; see generally William Thomas Worster, The Obligation to
Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Customary International Law, 27 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 441 (2019).
108. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 8. Certainly this limitation
applies to states party to the 1961 Statelessness Convention, but might also apply to states
generally under customary international law. This Author has argued elsewhere that such a rule
applies under customary international law, see, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Obligation
to Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Customary International Law, 27 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 441 (2019), but that argument will be omitted here because it is not necessary for
the conclusions herein, however, on this point compare the positive view of the European Court
of Human Rights, Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 26828/06, (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts July
13, 2010).
109. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1); ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); CRC, supra
note 90 art. 7; CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29.
110. See generally Worster, supra note 107.
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state grant nationality to stateless children born in the state’s territory,
without exception. The right to a nationality under other human rights
treaties does not explicitly provide for the state of birth to grant
nationality to an otherwise stateless child, although they may be
interpreted to impose that obligation. Various bodies have agreed that
the right against arbitrary revocation of nationality also applies equally
to arbitrary refusal. 111 After all, when a child is born stateless, he or she
is within the jurisdiction of only one state at the time of birth. There is
only one state that may bear the obligation for the child to have “a”
nationality. This conclusion is an exception to the general rule that we
cannot usually identify the state that is obliged to secure the right to a
nationality. Thus, the state where the stateless child is born must ensure
that the child has a nationality, which could be by granting nationality
or securing the child’s nationality from another state. For this reason, a
state would act unlawfully if it refuses to grant a newly born child its
nationality, unless the state effectively secures the child’s nationality
from another state. So if a child effectively held another nationality at
birth, then the birth state is excused from ranting its nationality. 112
In addition, other human rights may be relevant. For example, a
refusal to grant nationality that is discriminatory on one of the protected
grounds, 113 or results as punishment for the exercise of other human
rights, will be problematic. Also, refusals to recognize the nationality
of persons habitually resident in the territory of a new state would be
problematic if they resulted in statelessness. 114

111. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 1(1); ICCPR, supra note 75,
art. 24(3); CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29; CRC, supra note 90, art. 7(1), (1990); Arbitrary
Deprivation Report 2009, supra note 79, para. 60 (“In the context of the avoidance of
statelessness, arbitrary denial of nationality is just as grave as arbitrary deprivation of
nationality”); see generally U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of the Arbitrary Deprivation of
Nationality on the Enjoyment of the rights of Children Concerned, and Existing Laws and
Practices on Accessibility for Children to Acquire Nationality, inter alia, of the Country in
Which They are Born, if They Otherwise Would be Stateless, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/29 (Dec. 16,
2015) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015]; Office High Comm’r Refugees, Exec.
Comm. Concl. No. 106 (LVII) (2006), para. (i); H.R.C. Gen. Comm. 17, para. 8.
112. See Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48.
113. See CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CRPD, supra
note 84, art. 18; Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2009, supra note 79, art. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/13/34 (Dec.14, 2009); Myanmar Report, supra note 84, paras. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66; Austria
Report, supra note 84, paras. 5.4, 5.5.
114. See Human Rights Council Res. 32/5, U.N. Doc. A/62/53 (June 30, 2016) (“6.
Encourages States to grant their nationality to persons who had habitual residence in their
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b. Naturalization
The refusal to extend nationality to a person in the naturalization
process is the other scenario for refusal of nationality. Naturalization is
a significantly different scenario from acquisition at birth. 115 In
naturalization, the state granting nationality often has considerably
more discretion in deciding which persons qualify for nationality. At
the outset, we should note that naturalization policies that discriminate
on the impermissible bases of race, color, gender, religion, political
opinion or national or ethnic origin, are highly suspect and most likely
unlawful under international law.116 However, a state still retains broad
authority to determine qualification, even setting aside the
discriminatory grounds. In addition, although other instruments
encourage naturalization, but do not necessarily mandate it. For
example, the Refugee Convention obliges states to facilitate the
naturalization of refugees. 117 There are a few situations in which a state
is expected to naturalize individuals.
Under EU law, states have not had their discretion limited over
laws providing for naturalization. 118 In the Kaur case, the CJEU held
territory before it was affected by the succession of States, especially if those persons would
otherwise become stateless”).
115. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1); CNMW, supra note 75, arts. 1-3; ICCPR, supra
note 75, art. 24(3); CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CEDAW, supra note 75, at art. 9; CPMW,
supra note 75, art. 29; CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18(1)-(1); H.R.C. Dec. 2/111 (27 Nov. 2006);
H.R.C. Res. 13/2; H.R.C. Res. 10/13; H.R.C. Res. 7/10; H. R. Comm’n Res.1998/48 (17 Apr.
1998); H.R.C. Res. 1999/28; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45 (19 Apr. 2005); H.R.C. Gen. Comm. 17,
paras. 7-8; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45; CEDAW Gen. Recomm. No. 21: Equality in Marriage and
Family Relations, 1994, art. 9.
116. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CRC, supra
note 90, arts. 7, 8; CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens (Oct.
1, 2002) [hereinafter Discrimination Recommendation 2002]; Hum Rts. Comm. Gen Recomm.
No. 24.
117. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 34, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (“[Parties]
shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings”).
118. See Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8; Kaur Case, supra note 16; Micheletti Case,
supra note 15; Eur. Council Dec. concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty
of European Union, Annex 3, section A ‘Citizenship’, Denmark and the Treaty on European
Union, Dec. 31, 1992, O.J. (C 348) 1; First Report on the Citizenship of the Union, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (COM 702) (1993) (“wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community
reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual
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that a refusal by the United Kingdom to naturalize an application did
not raise issues under EU law. 119 The reasoning in that case is that, prior
to the naturalization, the individual does not hold EU citizenship, so the
protections of EU citizenship have not accrued to the person. It is a
highly formalistic approach that does not engage with the problem of
the Member State acting as a gatekeeper to EU citizenship.
One possible argument is the duty of sincere cooperation among
EU Member States. 120 Recently the European Commission has
produced a report criticizing the practice of some Member States that
grant expedited nationality to wealthy investors, even without a
residency or genuine connection requirement. 121 These “citizenshipby-investment” schemes not only grant EU Member State nationality,
but also, necessarily, EU citizenship. 122 Usually it is the EU citizenship
that is the prize, permitting the individual to take up unfettered
residence in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Rome, or Berlin rather than
Valletta or Nicosia. A particularly problematic aspect of the Member
State granting nationality accrued the benefit of the individual’s
investment, but did not have to bear the burden of providing services
to the new EU citizen who was resident in a more fashionable Member
State.
The Commission suggests that the citizenship by investment
schemes constitute an infringement of the duty of sincere cooperation
through the application of naturalization law. The Commission cited
the Nottebohm case 123 for the notion that nationality should only be
acquired on the basis of a “genuine connection” to the state.124
possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national
law of the Member State concerned”); Third Report from the Commission on Citizenship of the
Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 506) (2001); Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union, EUR.
PARL. DOC. (COM 695) (2004); Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(COM 85) (2008).
119. See Kaur Case, supra note 16.
120. See TEU, supra note 5, art. 4(3).
121. See Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (COM 12) 22-23 (2019).
122. See id.
123. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 23.
124. The Commission also offered its interpretation of a qualifying “genuine connection”
to include “genuine connection with the people of the country (by descent, origin or marriage)
or on a genuine connection with the country, established either by birth in the country or by
effective prior residence in the country for a meaningful duration. Other elements may be
required to attest to the existence of a genuine bond with the country, such as knowledge of a
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However, the Commission additionally argued that, following
Nottebohm, nationality granted by a state need only be recognized by
other states where such genuine connection exists. It continued to argue
that “[s]uch a common understanding of the bond of nationality
[genuine connection under Nottebohm] also lies at the basis of Member
States’ acceptance that Union citizenship and the rights entailed by it
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)
would accrue automatically to any person becoming one of their
citizens.” 125 While this is a correct statement of Nottebohm, this
argument is in direct conflict with Micheletti. Under Micheletti, the
European Union has a lex specialis regime on recognition of nationality
so that Member States are not permitted to second-guess the grant of
Member State nationality or give priority to another nationality,
because such practice would impact the enjoyment of EU citizenship.
Strange enough, the Commission also cites to Micheletti in its report.
126 The conclusion of the Commission is that the only way for Member
States to comply with Micheletti and yet also apply the Nottebohm
criterion is for the Member State granting nationality to be obliged to
apply Nottebohm. 127 Thus, Member States should be required to apply
the Nottebohm genuine link to their grants of nationality due to the duty
of sincere cooperation under the Treaty on European Union
(“TEU”). 128
Following from this report’s analysis, the duty of sincere
cooperation, which requires EU Member States to apply international
law to the acquisition of nationality, limits Member State discretion in
granting nationality. While an individual might not have a claim against
a Member State for refusal of nationality as per Kaur, the other Member
States of the Union might have a claim under Article 4(3) of the TEU.
However, it is yet unclear what the duty of sincere cooperation may
require in terms of requiring the grant of nationality contrasted with
national language and/or of the culture of the country, links with the community.” Investor
Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, supra note 121, at 5.
125. See id. at 5.
126. See id. (citing Case C-369/90, Micheletti & Others v Delegación del Gobierno en
Cantabria 1992 E.C.R. I-4253).
127. See id. at 6 (“each Member State needs to ensure that nationality is not awarded
absent any genuine link to the country or its citizens”).
128. See id. at n.31 (“The principle of sincere cooperation with other Member States and
the Union laid down by Article 4(3) TEU, obliges Member States to refrain from measures that
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”).
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obliging Member States to refuse the grant nationality. After all, the
Commission cited the impact on EU citizenship in Rottmann (which
concerned the revocation of Member State nationality) to support its
conclusion on the impact of citizenship by investment schemes
(concerning the grant of Member State nationality). 129 Apparently,
revocation of nationality and the grant of nationality are governed by
the same principles of due regard for EU law. There may be a trend
towards further erosion of Member State discretion in granting
nationality through naturalization in the future.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF
NATIONALITY
The above sections detailed the many ways in which the
revocation or refusal of EU Member State nationality might violate EU
law or international law. This discussion did not attempt to be
completely thorough and definitive, other than to simply highlight that
the revocation or refusal of nationality can be unlawful. These
protections vary from situation to situation with comparably stronger
protection in the case of revocation to relatively weaker protection in
the case of refusal. If a state refuses or revokes nationality in a way that
violates one of these provisions above, then the next question is the
impact on an individual’s EU citizenship.
The initial step in this analysis is to identify which actor would be
responsible for breaching international law by denying nationality. 130
The EU Member State refusing or revoking nationality would surely
be responsible since the norms described above are binding on states.131
But while the Member State has violated international law, that
violation does not automatically result in reversing the decision in
129. See id. at 5 (“The Court of Justice of the EU has held, in what is now settled caselaw, that, while it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and
loss of nationality, they must do so having due regard to Union law”). See also Micheletti Case,
supra note 15; Case C-179/98, Belg. v. Mesbah, 1999 E.C.R. I-07955; Case C-192/99, Kaur
Case, supra note 16; Zhu & Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep’t, supra note 8;
Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8; Tjebbes Case, supra note 8.
130. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep.: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art 2, (2001),
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep: Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, art. 4
(2011) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations].
131. See Draft articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 13.
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domestic law to deny nationality. Thus, EU citizenship would not
necessarily be restored in the eyes of the Member State. The following
paragraphs will examine the separate consideration of whether other
EU Member States or the Union itself might also be responsible if they
give recognition to the wrongful decision of the Member State.
To begin this analysis, we start with the obligation on all Member
States to give effect to EU citizenship. The TFEU states that an
individual has EU citizenship when he or she is “holding” the
nationality of a Member State. 132 Implicitly, “holding” is the exclusive
way to acquire EU citizenship, not merely one method of many. 133
However, the rule of “holding” as stated in the TFEU is not complete.
As noted above, there are other ways that individuals can be excluded
from EU citizenship despite “holding” Member State nationality. 134 In
addition, the provision does not state that EU citizenship is lost upon
loss of the Member State nationality, nor does it clearly state that EU
citizenship is lost upon the withdrawal of a Member State from the
132. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 20(1), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J.
(C 326) 56. See also Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
29 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and
Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States Amending Regulation (EEC) N0
1612/68 and Repealing Directives 64/221/EEC. Case C-413/99, Baumbast, supra note 8; Case
C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office National de l’emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-06191.
133. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 359 (noting that a state joining the European
Union, and becoming an EU Member State, is the one exception to the usual rule that a person
only acquires EU citizenship when he or she acquires EU Member State nationality; in this case,
the person acquires the nationality and EU citizenship at separate moments).
134. Cf. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), art.
355(5) (ex. art. 299(2), 1st sub-para. & art 299(3)-(6) TEC), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J. (C 326) 198
(“the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe Islands”) with Treaty amending, with regard to
Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, 13 Mar. 1984, 1985 O.J. (L
29). See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), art.
355(5)(c) (ex. art 299(2), 1st sub-par. & art 299(3)-(6) TEC), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J. (C 326) 198
(“the Treaties shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary
to ensure the implementation of . . . the European Economic Community and . . . European
Atomic Energy Community”); Note From the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland to the Government of the Italian Republic Concerning a Declaration by the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Replacing the Declaration on the
Definition of the Term “National” Made at the Time of Signature of the Treaty of Accession of
January 22, 1972 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European
Communities, from R. Arculus, Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Rome, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Italy (Dec. 31, 1982) U.K.T.S. 67 (1983) (“a) British citizens; b) Persons who are
British subjects by virtue of Part IV of the British Nationality Act 1981 . . .”); Treaty of
Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1st U.K. Declaration, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J.
(L 73), 196.
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Union. 135 Although this automatic loss of EU citizenship could be
implied by the present tense of the verb “holding,” and Rottmann seems
to suggest that conclusion, the strong norms against loss of nationality
in international law might argue against this assumption.136
Nonetheless, “holding” appears to be the, probably exclusive, test for
the acquisition of EU citizenship, with other rules pertaining to
exceptions to the “holding” rule.
“Holding” could have one of several meanings. Generally, it
suggests a de facto grasping of nationality, yet we also frequently say
that we can “hold” a claim of right despite not presently enjoying it in
fact. By contrast, the TFEU does not say that a person has EU
citizenship “upon confirmation of Member State nationality” or “upon
production of a member State passport,” or some similar phrase.137
Where a person has lost his or her passport or national identity card, he
or she is still an EU citizen, though evidentiary issues may be
challenging in such a case. We could even imagine a situation where a
Member State acknowledged that the person holds its nationality, yet
refuses to print a passport for some, possibly unlawful, reason. In these
cases, we recognize that the person “holds” the right to nationality. The
terms in the TFEU are phrased not as a de facto enjoyment or
evidencing of nationality, but as a consequential operation of law.
Thus, we should more correctly understand the term “holding” to mean
that if a person holds Member State nationality by right of law, then he
or she holds EU citizenship, also by right of law.
In addition, the TFEU should be interpreted consistent with
international law, including, inter alia, the rules on interpreting
treaties 138 and the rules on responsibility, 139 but also primary rules such
as the right to a nationality. This is not to say that international law
overrules the TFEU, but that, when ambiguous, the treaty should be
135. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 341. Equally it does not state that EU citizenship
is acquired when a state joins the EU. Again, that effect is deduced from the language in the
TEU. See id.
136. See id.
137. See supra note 132.
138. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
139. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note
125, at 53, art. 4. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Malcom Evans & Panos Koutrakos
eds., 2013).
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read in compliance with international law. While EU citizenship is not
a nationality in the sense of being a legal bond with a state, it is a legal
bond with the Union, and international law protections on nationality
focus on the legal bond as the status that is being protected. 140 After all,
the Member State could have used any number of different terms in the
Treaties on European Union than “citizenship” to describe this status,
and yet they deliberately choose to use it. Like nationality, citizenship
is also necessarily a status expressing a legal bond with a state. If the
Union can contemplate a “citizenship,” then it should have sufficient
capacity to contemplate a legal bond. Mutatis mutandis, international
law should protect EU citizenship in a similar manner as protection of
nationality. If international law would prohibit states from refusing
nationality, then the terms in the TFEU should be read that way as well.
This possibility to independently inquire into whether a person
holds Member State nationality, and thus EU citizenship, should be
distinguished from Micheletti. In that case, the CJEU held that when
nationality was granted, other Member States cannot refuse to
recognize it. 141 Here, the question is where nationality was refused,
whether other Member States must recognize that refusal. In a sense,
the receiving Member State is refusing to recognize an act of state of
the other Member State, but surely the receiving Member State is not
prohibited from taking a more generous view in favor of the person.
Having considered that the TFEU can be interpreted to permit a
receiving Member State to recognize nationality, even when the
original Member State is denying nationality, we next consider whether
a refusal to consider the person an EU citizen would be unlawful. The
other Member States of the Union could be faced with a person whose
nationality has been revoked or refused by one of the sister states in the
European Union. The Member State receiving the person will need to
determine how to address the situation if the individual claims that this
denial is wrongful, and if he or she actually enjoys EU citizenship and
rights such as free movement. While the initial denial of nationality
would be unlawful, the receiving state will have to take separate
decisions in reaction to the unlawful act. For example, the receiving
Member State would have to decide if the person was an EU citizen for
purposes of admission and expulsion, rights to remain and seek
employment, voting in certain elections, and so on. Because these are
140. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9 at 357.
141. See Micheletti Case, supra note 15, para. 15.
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distinct acts, and the TFEU would permit a state to interpret “holding”
liberally, a Member State recognizing an unlawful denial of nationality
would be committing its own distinct unlawful act.
A similar analysis applies to the Union itself. Of course, EU law
applies to the Union, but the other obligations under international law
mentioned in the previous sections also apply. 142 The Union, as a
separate legal person, will see that its Member States disagree over the
nationality of an individual, with one outcome favoring EU citizenship
and the other not. If the issue comes before the Union, perhaps by
referring the case to the CJEU or if the individual is a candidate for
European Parliamentary election or applies for an employment position
with the organs of the Union, 143 the Union will need to determine
whether the person enjoys EU citizenship. The reasoning above
suggests that an individual appearing in a Member State, claiming
nationality in another Member State and EU citizenship, but whose
original Member State refuses to acknowledge nationality, might
nonetheless “hold” nationality sufficient for EU citizenship. If a
Member State refuses to recognize that EU citizenship that the person
holds by right, then the Member State would have violated European
law.
A.

Obligation of cessation

The following sections will examine the various obligations that
accrue to a state when it has violated international law, and will apply
those obligations to the Member State refusing nationality, the Member
State recognizing that refusal, and the Union itself. Under the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, the first, and the most obvious,
obligation of a state, when it is responsible for an internally wrongful
142. E.g., Nold Kohlen-und Baustoffgrobhandlung v. KG Comm’n Eur. Comm’ties, supra
note 62; Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-03655;
Case C-286/90 Ankagemyndigheden v. Poulsen & Diva Navigation Corp., 1992 E.C.R. I-06019;
Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v Council Eur. Union &
Comm’n Eur. Comm’ties, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 [hereinafter Kadi Case]; Case C-366/10, Air
Transp. Case, supra note 62.
143. See, e.g., Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol No. 3 on the
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 3(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
210, (“Any person who is a Union citizen and fulfils the conditions laid down . . . may submit
an application. The Council, acting on a recommendation from the Court of Justice, shall
determine the conditions and the arrangements governing the submission and processing of such
applications”).
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act or omission is to cease the act 144 and not repeat it. 145 Needless to
say that the above principles are also equally applicable to all
international organizations, as expressed in the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations, 146 including the
European Union. 147 International law governing nationality interprets
the obligation to cease as an obligation to restore or reinstate nationality
when it is unlawfully denied. 148 This obligation is equally applicable to
international organizations that act unlawfully. 149 This obligation is not
particularly controversial and would require the Member State
unlawfully refusing nationality to restore it. Also, as the other Member
States and the Union are taking separate, independent action in
applying the TFEU, it is arguable that the other Member States and the
Union must recognize EU citizenship when a Member State has
unlawfully refused nationality. This latter obligation only pertains to
EU citizenship because that is the only legal obligation applicable to
the Member State; it does not necessarily apply to the recognition of
Member State nationality. While it may seem incoherent to recognize
144. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 29 (“The legal
consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this Part do not affect the continued duty
of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached.”); Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 30 (“The State responsible for the internationally wrongful
act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing”).
145. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 30 (“The State
responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: . . . (b) to offer
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require”).
146. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note
125, arts. 41(1), 42(2); see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 167, para. 159 (July
9); U.N.S.C. Res. 662 para. 2 (Aug. 9, 1990) (calling on “all States, international organizations
and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or
dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation”).
147. See European Community, Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (reproduced in 31 Int’l L. Mats. 1485,
1487 (1992)) (articulating the rule of nonrecognition of results of acts of aggression).
148. See Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015, supra note 111, at 5-6 (“States must provide
a child who has been illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity with
appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her
identity”). An effective remedy must also be available in the context of arbitrary deprivation of
nationality (see A/HRC/13/34, A/HRC/25/28 and CRC/C/DOM/CO/3-5) . . . Where children
have, in contravention of international law, been arbitrarily deprived of their nationality and
rendered stateless, States must ensure that effective and appropriate remedies are available,
including reinstatement of nationality”).
149. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note
125, arts. 29, 30, 42(2).
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EU citizenship without necessarily recognizing Member State
nationality, we can recall that the TFEU only requires Member States
to give effect to EU citizenship. 150
B.

Obligation to refuse to recognize an unlawful act

In addition, when a state acts unlawfully, other states are required
to refuse to recognize the unlawful act. 151 This section will consider
whether a Member State or the Union is obliged to constructively
recognize EU citizenship when Member State nationality is being
refused unlawfully, or whether that is merely a permissible reading of
the TFEU. It will also go beyond the obligation of cessation because
that obligation only pertains to EU citizenship specifically.
1. Jus cogens
States are not permitted to recognize the consequences of jus
cogens violations as lawful or render aid to the state concerned to
maintain the unlawful situation. 152 The nonrecognition covers the
outcomes of the unlawful acts, and includes reactions that expressly or
implicitly recognize the new situation. 153 The unlawful acts should be
treated as having “no legal validity . . . [being] considered null and
void.” 154
The second obligation incumbent on states when there is a
violation of jus cogens norms is to require the state to refuse to aid or

150. See supra note 132.
151. See infra Secs. IV.B.1-2.
152. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40 (“1. This chapter
applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law”); (“2. No State shall
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”); see also id. art. 41; E. Timor Case (Port.
v. Aust’lia), Juris., Judgement, 1995 ICJ Reps. 103-4; Legal Conseq. for Sts. of the Cont.
Presence of S. Afr. in Namibia (SW Afr.) notwithstanding SC Res. 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion]. But see SC Res. 276 (1970),
Adv. Op., 1971 ICJ Reps. 16, 55-6 (June 21); Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94 Eur. Ct.
H. R. 17 (2001); Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute Over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko
Area (Rep. Srpska v. Fed. Bosnia & Herzegovina), Award, paras. 77-78 (Feb. 14, 1997),
reprinted at 36 INT’L L. MATS. 396; JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
135 (1987); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420-21 (1948).
153. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(5).
154. See e.g. U.N.S.C. Res. 662 (Aug. 9, 1990).
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otherwise assist in the unlawful act. 155 This obligation is more than the
obligation to simply not help another state violate its obligations, as
covered in Draft Articles on State Responsibility Article 11, 156 and this
provision specifically targets acts that aid in maintaining an unlawful
situation. 157
We will next consider whether the rules against denial of
nationality constitute jus cogens norms. It is quite an understatement to
say that proving the existence of a jus cogens norm is exceedingly
difficult. As Ian Brownlie concluded, “more authority exists for the
category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content.” 158 A
decision of whether an act amounts to a violation of a jus cogens norm
is often contained in a UN Security Council decision, 159 but that is not
a necessary condition for the act to have such character. 160 At a basic
level, the rule includes any provision that is non-derogable, 161 though
as a test for jus cogens nature, this statement is likely to be too broad.
One approach is to determine which norms protect “the survival of
States and their peoples and the most basic human values.” 162 More
specifically, the rule could qualify as jus cogens if it covers “the
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights.”163
155. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(2) (“No State shall
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”); id. art. 41(4).
156. See id. art. 11.
157. See id. arts. 41(11), 41(12). See also U.N.S.C. Council Res. 218 (Nov. 23, 1965);
U.N.S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977); U.N.S.C. Res. 569 (July 26, 1985).
158. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-17 (1999).
159. See, e.g., U.N.G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 24, 2014); U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art.
6, para. 3 (Dec. 14, 1974); U.N.G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV), para. 5 (Dec. 16, 1970); U.N.G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
160. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Op, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 141 paras. 132–37 (July 22)
(separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) [hereinafter Kosovo Declaration]; GabčíkovoNagymaros Proj. (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J Reps. 7, 54, 78 (Sept. 25); LAUTERPACHT, supra
note 143, at 421.
161. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(2) (“In accordance
with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law
is one which is: ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”).
162. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(3) (“. . . substantive
rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it
presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values”).
163. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 282, 303 et seq.
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These rules are elevated to having jus cogens quality due to
“considerations of morals and international good order.” 164
Another approach is to look at commonalities in the existing rules
of jus cogens. Examples of norms that have been understood to have
this character include the prohibition of aggression, 165 piracy, 166
slavery, 167 genocide, 168 racial discrimination, 169 apartheid,170 and
torture, 171 as well as rules requiring the basic rules of international
humanitarian law, 172 and self-determination. 173 In any event, the
various experts, negotiators and judiciaries agree that the examples of
jus cogens norms were not exhaustive. 174 Other possible jus cogens
norms mentioned at the negotiations over the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) include the rules of state equality, 175
164. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 [2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1958] (Fitzmaurice) [hereinafter
Fitzmaurice]. See also U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 54th mtg. at 311, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 (May 6, 1968) (Italy: Maresca) (“mankind’s awareness of the law” and
“the conscience of mankind.).
165. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); Fitzmaurice,
supra note 164; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, supra note 155, at 311 (1968) (Italy: Maresca)
(discussing rules that “ensured the maintenance of peace”); U.N.G.A. Conf. Law of Treaties, 1st
sess., 52nd mtg, paras. 3, 31, & 43; 53rd mtg., paras. 4, 9, 15, 16, 35, 48, 59, & 69; 54th mtg,
paras. 9, 41, 46; 55; 55th mtg, paras. 31 & 42; 56th mtg, paras. 6, 20, 29, & 51.
166. Fitzmaurice, supra note 164; Documents of the 5th Session Including the Report of
the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ON.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 [2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 1953].
167. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 1953, supra note 166.
168. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); Crim (Jer) 40/61
AG v. Eichmann (1961) (Isr.) (reprinted at 36 INT’L L. MATS. 5).
169. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, & Uruguay).
170. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 40(4); U.N.S.C. Res.
217, para. 3 (Nov. 20, 1965).
171. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art.40(5); Al-Adsani v.
UK, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 61 (2001); R. v Bartle & Comm’r Police for the
Metro. [1999] UKHL 17 (appeal) (UK).
172. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(5); U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/11, paras. 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, & Uruguay).
173. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(5); U.N.G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, at 121 (Oct.
24, 1970).
174. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, arts. 40(3), 40(6);
Fiztmaurice, supra note 164.
175. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 311 (1968) (Italy: Maresca) (discussing rules that
maintained “the existence and equality of States”).
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freedom of the high seas, 176 and the prohibition on colonialism
(perhaps as part of the right to self-determination). 177 In addition, the
delegates specifically discussed the protection of the person as a jus
cogens norm, 178 which might narrowly cover only certain fundamental
human rights 179 or more broadly cover most human rights. 180 CJEU
jurisprudence suggests that the obligation of states to admit their own
nationals to their territory, 181 and the rules on the nationality of persons
and ships, 182 would be non-derogable, and in the Kadi case, the CJEU
found that “respect for human rights” had jus cogens character. 183
Some cases of denial of nationality might rise to the level of jus
cogens when practiced in the context of other jus cogens obligations. It
goes without saying that the refusal or withdrawal of nationality would
be a jus cogens violation when that measure was taken on a prohibited
ground of discrimination, such as racial, ethnic, religious, etc. Denial
of nationality due to racial, ethnic, religion, etc. 184 Some authorities
have opined that the denial of nationality that leads to detention might
amount to mistreatment equivalent to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. 185 However, those practices might not rise to the level of jus
cogens because only torture is the one most clearly established as a jus
176. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 302 (1968).
177. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland,
Ukraine, & Uruguay).
178. Fitzmaurice, supra note 164; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 311 (1968) (Italy:
Maresca).
179. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland,
Ukraine, & Uruguay).
180. See generally Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Ad. Op.,
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sep. 17, 2003).
181. See Case 42/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, para. 22, 1974 E.C.R. I-1338.
182. See Chen v. Sec’y of St. for the Home Dept., supra note 8, para. 37; Rottmann v.
Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 39, 53, 58.
183. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 282, 303-4.
184. See Gay McDougall (Independent Expert on Minority Issues), Human Rights
Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/23 (Feb. 28,
2008) (stating that prohibition of discrimination is a non-derogation norm). See also Int’l L.
Comm’n, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of
States, art. 15, II Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 37 (1999).
185. See Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015, supra note 111 (“41. . . . stateless children in
context of migration or forced displacement are more vulnerable to arbitrary and lengthy
immigration detention because their lack of a nationality makes it impossible to remove them
from the country within a reasonable period of time. Such detention may be considered in
violation of both the freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the freedom from
arbitrary deprivation of liberty”).
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cogens norm. Although the Human Rights Council concluded that
denial of nationality qualified as cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, it did not go so far as to argue that nationality denial is itself
torture. 186 However, it is at least conceivable that nationality
deprivation, possibly in connection with other aggravating factors,
might indeed rise to the level of torture, although examples of such
situations are perhaps more difficult to articulate. Lastly, denial of
nationality without any means of judicial or administrative review
would also be problematic and certainly a violation of fundamental
rights, 187 though it might be a stretch to view that as a jus cogens
violation.
Setting aside unlawful nationality denial that implicates other jus
cogens norms, this paragraph will consider whether unlawful
nationality denial alone would itself amount to a jus cogens violation.
The right to a nationality certainly appears to be so critical that it could
fall within the lists given above and has been described as nonderogable. 188 It is unclear whether the UNHCR understands unlawful
nationality denial to be a jus cogens norm, though that possibility is not
excluded. 189 The right to nationality is a fundamental right 190 which is
interlinked with and central to the enjoyment of many other human

186. See supra note 185.
187. See Policy Dep’t for Citizens’ Rights & Constitutional Affairs, Eur. Parliament’s
Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, E.U. and Member States’ Policies and
Laws on Persons Suspected of Terrorism-related Crimes, E.U. Doc. PE 596.832 (Dec. 18, 2017).
188. See Expelled Dominicans & Haitians v. Dom. Rep., Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 253 (Aug. 28, 2014); Girls
Yean & Bosico v. Dom. Rep., Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), paras. 136-38 (Sep. 8, 2005).
189. See, e.g., Expert Mtg., The Concept of Stateless Persons Under International Law:
Summary, para. 18 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf [https://perma.cc/P62VRRG4 ] (comparing nonrecognition of state created through violation of jus cogens norms
against use of force to recognition of statelessness created contrary to law).
190. H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 1 (“Reaffirm[ing] the right to a nationality of
every human person is a fundamental human right enshrined in, inter alia, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights”); Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257-68 (1967) (deciding
that Congress did not have the power to revoke nationality on constitutional grounds).
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rights. 191 It has been called the “right to have rights.” 192 It does, after
all, repetitively appear in virtually every major human rights treaty, 193
suggesting it is a human rights norm of very special significance. There
is a very consistent pattern of resolutions by the Human Rights Council
that the human right to nationality is a fundamental human right and
that the arbitrary deprivation of it is unlawful. 194 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights held that the right to a nationality provides a
foundation link to a state for protection of human rights. 195 The Human
Rights Committee concluded similarly that the arbitrary revocation of
nationality can impact an individual’s ability to enjoy all of his or her
human rights, 196 and that the revocation of nationality simply as a
pretext to expel a person was a denial of the person’s fundamental
191. H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, at 2 (Stressing “that all human rights are universal,
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and that the international community must treat
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same
emphasis”).
192. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 292-300 (1994).
See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that denationalization is “the total
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society”).
193. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); H.R.C. Dec. 2/111, supra note 111; H.R.C.
Res. 13/2, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 79;
H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res.
2005/45, supra note 111; CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); Discrimination Recommendation
2002, supra note116, paras. 13-14; CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CEDAW Gen. Recomm. No.
21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 1994, art. 9; CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29;
CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18(1); American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica”) (B-32), Nov, 22, 1969, art. 3, OAS TS No. 36, 144 UNTS 123, reprinted at BASIC
DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992) (AmCHR); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights
and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2012). See also
G.A. Res. 217A(III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), art. 6 (Dec. 10, 1948);
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX (May 2, 1948), art.
XVII, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1.
194. See H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res.
13/2, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 20/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/4 (July 16, 2012); H.R.C.
Res. 20/5, supra note 79); H.R.C. Res. 26/14 (26 June 2014); H.R.C. Res 32/5, supra note 110.
195. Proposed Amends. to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion, OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 32-35 (Jan. 19, 1984) (“the right
to a nationality established therein provides the individual with a minimal measure of legal
protection in international relations through the link his nationality establishes between him and
the state in question . . . .”).
196. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 7 (noting “that the full enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms of an individual might be impeded as a result of the
arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and that such individuals are placed in a situation of
increased vulnerability to human rights violations”).
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human rights. 197 Furthermore, the link of nationality with a state has
been identified as critical for the individual’s sense of identity, 198
explaining the reason why children have a specially protected right to
a nationality, 199 and in situations of state succession. All of the
foregoing suggests that a good case can be argued that the right to a
nationality is itself a jus cogens norm.
In addition to the discussion above, it is arguable that the
European Union would be without powers to recognize an unlawful
refusal of nationality. The Kadi decision of the CJEU attempted to
determine the full scope of the obligations imposed by a UN Security
Council Resolution which was in turn implemented in the EU Member
State through an act of the Union. 200 The Court took the unusual
approach of considering that a treaty cannot be adopted that violates
jus cogens so that an international organization, founded by a treaty,
also cannot be understood to have powers to adopt acts that violate jus
cogens. 201 On this basis, the Security Council cannot prescribe actions
that entail violations of jus cogens. 202 Essentially, the CJEU used jus
cogens norms as a tool for interpreting the powers of an international
organization. A similar approach might be taken with regard to EU
citizenship and the unlawful denial of Member State nationality. As the
TFEU is interpreted using the standard law of treaties, 203 we might
interpret the Union as not having the power to refuse to recognize EU
citizenship in such a case.

197. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 3 (“that the statelessness of a person
resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of his or her nationality cannot be invoked by States as
a justification for the denial of other human rights”).
198. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 11 (reiterating, “that the right to identity
is intimately linked to the right of nationality”).
199. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 9 (reaffirming, “that every child has the
right to acquire a nationality, and recognizes the special needs of children for protection against
arbitrary deprivation of nationality”).
200. See Kadi Case, supra note 142.
201. See id; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 138, art. 53, 64.
202. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 53, 64.
203. See Case C-70/09, Hengartner & Gassner v. Landesregierung Vorarlberg, Judgment,
2010 E.C.R. I-7233, I-7244, para. 36 (2010); Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council,
1998 E.C.R. II-02739; Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, supra note
142.
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2. Ex injuria jus non oritur
Returning to the duty of nonrecognition, it is important to note
that this duty is not only imposed for jus cogens violations. In fact, it is
the general principle of ex injuria jus non oritur, applicable to any
unlawful act. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ found that South
Africa was in violation of an obligation imposed by the UN Security
Council, 204 not necessarily a jus cogens norm. Certainly the underlying
violation was most likely a jus cogens norm, but the ICJ did not need
to reach that finding in order to invoke ex injuria jus non oritur for
violating a binding Security Council resolution.205 In addition to the
Namibia situation, the UN Security Council has demanded
nonrecognition for a number of other cases. 206
But the obligation of nonrecognition is not limited to only UN
Security Council resolutions; it accrues to any violation of international
law. 207 For example, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the
204. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152 (“The member States of the United Nations
are, for the reasons given in paragraph 115 above [binding nature of U.N.S.C resolutions], under
obligation to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa’s continued presence in
Namibia. They are also under obligation to refrain from lending any support or any form of
assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia, subject to paragraph 125
below”).
205. See id. paras. 117-18 (June 21).
206. See Kosovo Declaration, supra note 160, para. 14 (separate opinion by Koroma, J.)
As subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, they [the international territorial
administration in Kosovo] possess limited authority derived from and circumscribed
by [UN Security Council] resolution 1244 (1999). No power is vested in any of those
bodies to determine the final status of Kosovo, nor do any of them have the power to
create other bodies which would have such a power. Accordingly, when the Assembly
of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo purported to declare
independence on 17 February 2008, they attempted to carry out an act which exceeded
their competence. As such, the declaration is a nullity, an unlawful act that violates
express provisions of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). It is ex injuria non
oritur jus (internal citations omitted).
U.N.S.C. Res. 216 (1965); U.N.S.C. Res. 217 (1965); U.N.S.C. Res. 277 (1970); U.N.S.C. Res.
242 (1967); U.N.S.C. Res. 288 (1970); U.N.S.C. Res. 476 (1980); U.N.S.C. Res. 478 (1980);
U.N.S.C. Res. 491 (1981); U.N.S.C. Res. 836 (1993); U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX); Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(8).
207. See Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Gr. v. UK), Judgment, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 5, at 50 (Mar. 26); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.) (Claim for
Indemnity) (Juris.), Judgment, 1927, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26); L. Status of E.
Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Apr. 5) (Anzilotti,
J., dissenting) (“[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at law. . . .”); Divers. of
Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B, no 70); Divers. of
Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 PCIJ, Ser. P.C.I.J. (ser. C, No 81), para. 240; U.S.
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ICJ also found that ex injuria jus non oritur applied generally and, in
that case, applied to the rather mundane violation of a treaty for the
construction of infrastructure. 208 Also, in the Namibia opinion held that
the obligation of nonrecognition applies to all states in the world, not
only to UN Member States. 209 Since non-members of an organization
cannot be legally responsible for violating Security Council
resolutions, it cannot be the normative force of the resolution that
required states to refuse to recognize the legal effects of Namibia’s
actions. Lastly, we find the same conclusion implied in the views of the
Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties. In preparing his report,
Lauterpacht, quoting McNair, concluded that a treaty would be
rendered void when it had as its object any violation of customary
international law, not only jus cogens norms or Security Council
resolutions. 210 For these reasons, we need not necessarily find that the
right to a nationality constitutes a jus cogens norm in order to apply the
principle of ex injuria jus non oritur.
Following Namibia, the precise parameters of the nonrecognition
obligation are wide-ranging. Primarily, other states must regard the
official acts of the state pertaining to the unlawful conduct as
“invalid,” 211 and “void” on the international plane. 212 Specifically, the
Dipl. & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 51, 58 (May 24) (Morozov
& Tarazi, JJ., dissenting, at 53–55, 62–63); Military & Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 270; (June 27) (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting); Accord. with Kosovo Declaration, supra note 160, para. 132-37 (separate opinion
by Cançado Trindade, J.) (“According to a well-established general principle of international
law, a wrongful act cannot become a source of advantages, benefits or rights for the wrongdoer
: ex injuria jus non oritur” although applying the principle only to cases of “grave breaches” or
“atrocities perpetrated against the population”) (internal citations omitted). See generally
William Thomas Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on International Legal Norms, 28
AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 443 (2013).
208. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. / Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 76,
para. 133 (Sep. 25).
The Court, however, cannot disregard the fact . . . Nor can it overlook that factual situation
. . . This does not mean that facts - in this case facts which flow from wrongful conduct determine the law. The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is sustained by the Court’s finding that
the legal relationship created by the 1977 Treaty is preserved and cannot in this case be treated
as voided by unlawful conduct.
209. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 126.
210. See II YB Int’l L. Comm’n 154 (1953) (Lauterpacht citing McNair) (“It is believed
that a treaty between two States the execution of which contemplates the infliction upon a third
State of what customary international law regards as a wrong is illegal and invalid ab initio.”
211. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125.
212. See U.N.S.C. Res. 662, para. 1 (Aug. 9, 1990) (“[N]ull and void”).
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other states may not enter into treaties pertaining to the unlawful act,213
cannot conduct economic relations pertaining to the unlawful act,214
and cannot send diplomatic or consular missions in support of the
unlawful act. 215
However, the risk is that the refusal to recognize official acts
might harm individuals. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ
concluded that there was a different consideration for “general
conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the nonperformance of which may adversely affect the people of [the
state].” 216 Where the nonrecognition of official acts would operate to
the detriment of the population, those acts may be recognized
exceptionally. 217 This conclusion leads to the dissonance that an
official act of state may be lawful and valid for some purposes, but not
lawful or valid for other purposes. However, this conclusion makes
sense, because otherwise states could not apply, for example,
international humanitarian law to situations arising from unlawful
aggression, because the aggression was unlawful and “void.” 218 We

213. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 122. Additionally, other states must
suspend operation of existing treaties pertaining to the unlawful conduct. Id.
214. See id. para. 124.
215. See id. para. 123.
216. See id. para. 122. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 152, paras. 4, 5; Hopkins v.
Mex., 4 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 41 (1926); R. (on the application of Kibris Turk Hava
Yollari) v Secretary of State for Transport, Case No: CO/3512/2007 [2009] E.W.H.C. 1918
(Admin); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 253 (2009) (Eng.); Emin v Yeldag [2002] 1 F.L.R. 956
(UK); B v. B (Divorce: N. Cyprus) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 707, [2001] 3 F.C.R. 331 (UK); Somalia v.
Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA (The Mary) [1993] QB 54 (UK); Reel v. Holder [1981]
1 W.L.R. 1226; [1981] 3 All E.R. 321; (1981) 125 S.J. 585 (UK); Hesperides Hotels Ltd v.
Aegean Turk. Holidays Ltd [1978] 1 QB 205 (UK); In re Al-Fin Corp.’s Patent, [1970] Ch 160,
177-81 (UK); Luigi Monta of Genoa v Cechofracht Co [1956] 2 QB 552; [1956] 3 WLR 480
(QB Div., Jun. 14, 1956) (Sellers, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 205(3)
(1987).
217. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125 (“should not result in depriving the
people of [the state] of any advantages derived from international co-operation . . . [the]
invalidity [of official acts] cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration
of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the
inhabitants of the Territory”).
218. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 807-8 (1997); Enzo Canizzaro,
Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 791 (2006); Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUDIES 227 (1983).
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would not want the legal nullification of unlawful acts to excuse an
actor from responsibility for other consequential obligations. 219
For the topic of this Article on unlawful denial of Member State
nationality and EU citizenship, the obligation of nonrecognition could
operate to render certain individuals as enjoying Member State
nationality constructively and EU citizenship accordingly. If indeed,
the refusal of nationality is unlawful as argued above, then the denial
of that nationality must be “invalid.” 220 If the denial is invalid, then the
Member State must be deemed to have granted nationality de jure, even
if it has not done so de facto. 221 In turn, if the Member State is deemed
to have granted nationality de jure, then EU law commands that the
individual also acquires EU citizenship.
There is some precedent for recognizing a person as having a
nationality when the person, in fact, does not.222 For example, states
have recognized the “nationality” of individuals from Taiwan,
Northern Cyprus, Palestine, and colonial mandates for certain

219. Some questionable, quasi-states, while not recognized as states, are still held to
human rights and international humanitarian law. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgment, paras. 115-46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Appls. Ch., July 15, 1999);
Gould et al. v. PLO & Palestinian Auth., Case No. 04-CIV.-00397 (GBD) (SDNY, Feb. 25,
2015); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 291-444
(2006); see generally JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (1952); PHILIP ALSTON, The “Not-aCat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?,
in., NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Rep. China [on
Taiwan Island], Ofc Pres., President Ma Attends Press Conference Unveiling English Version
of Taiwan’s First National Human Rights Report under the ICCPR and ICESCR (Dec. 18, 2012)
available
at
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=28855&rmid=2355
[https://perma.cc/LMJ7-M4D5] ; Rep. China [on Taiwan Island], Ofc Pres., President Ma Holds
Press Conference on the Release of Taiwan’s First Human Rights Report (Apr. 20, 2012)
available
at
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&rmid=2355&itemid=27092
[https://perma.cc/U6YV-PCNB].
220. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125.
221. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Mtg. The Concept of Stateless
Persons under International Law, para. 20 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR63-53T3] (“[Statelessness] refers to a factual situation, not to the manner
in which a person became stateless”).
222. See generally William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of
Non-State Actors, 42 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 207 (2016).
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purposes. 223 Also, the Human Rights Committee, in the context of the
right to return to one’s own country, has held that individuals
unlawfully denied their nationality still retain the right to return to their
“own country,” despite no longer actually holding their state’s
nationality. 224
This conclusion on the constructive acquisition of EU citizenship
is strengthened by the ICJ’s statements in Namibia that treaties must be
applied or suspended to the degree to which they pertain to the unlawful
conduct. 225 This author has already argued that the TFEU can be read
to permit recognition of EU citizenship despite the unlawful denial of
Member State nationality, simply by another Member State making a
good faith determination that a person holds EU citizenship, even
though in disagreement with another Member State. For the obligation
of ex injuria jus non oritur under discussion in this section, other states
cannot enter into economic and other relations with the state pertaining
223. See U.N. Compensation Commission Dec., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, art. 5.2
(June 26, 1992) (permitting third parties to submit claims on behalf of individuals who cannot
get their claims submitted by a government); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL AND HANDBOOK, 403.4-4(D), 403.4-7(C) (providing passport instructions to agency
officials in accordance with United States’ recognition policy and general consistency with
current sovereignty regarding Republic of China on Taiwan Island and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus) [hereinafter FAM]; Caglar v. Billingham (Insp. of Taxes) [1996] STC 150
(SCD) at 151 (Eng.); 584 Hansard HL col. WA205 (Jan. 15, 1998); 304 Hansard HC col. WA277
(Jan. 15, 1998); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31
(2006) (regarding “A” Mandated Territories); Linda A. Taylor, The United Nations
Compensation Commission, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 197, 202 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens eds.,
2009); see also Paul Koring, Palestine exists for a select few Canadians, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Sep. 20, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/palestine-exists-for-a-selectfew-canadians/article594913 [https://perma.cc/JZB7-6MCM] (explaining that Palestine exists
as a valid “Country of Birth” for Canadians despite their government not recognizing Palestine
as a state). But see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL AND HANDBOOK, 403.44(A)(h) (prohibiting “Palestine” as a valid country of birth after 1948 and requiring instead
“West Bank,” “Gaza Strip,” or “Israel”).
224. Gen. Comm. on the Freedom of Movement, Human Rights Comm. on its SixtySeventh Session held on Oct. 18, 1999, para. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1,
1999):
Thus, the persons entitled to exercise this right . . . embraces, at the very least, an
individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a given
country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. This would be the case, for example,
of nationals of a country who have there been stripped of their nationality in violation
of international law . . . .
225. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 122 (June 21). Additionally, states must
suspend operation of existing treaties pertaining to the unlawful conduct. Id.
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to the unlawful conduct. 226 This obligation means that the economic
and other rights in the TFEU must be applied as if the unlawful act has
not occurred. To refuse to honor the individual’s constructive EU
citizenship would be to enter into an economic relationship that honors
the refusal of EU citizenship. Furthermore, states cannot send
diplomatic and consular missions that support or give implied validity
to the unlawful acts. This obligation suggests that the officers of the
state must discharge their functions in a manner not recognizing the
unlawful act. Immigration officers, consuls giving protection, etc. must
treat the person whose nationality is unlawfully denied as having
constructive EU citizenship or they will be giving effect to the unlawful
state action. 227
In addition to all of the considerations above, the ICJ’s Namibia
exception for issues of humanitarian nature also commands that we
honor constructive EU citizenship. 228 Certainly, giving legal effect to a
state’s unlawful denial of nationality would adversely affect
individuals. Where the nonrecognition of official acts would operate to
the detriment of the population, then they may be recognized.229
Because this is an exception for the benefit of people, constructive
nationality and EU citizenship should be recognized where they work
to the person’s advantage (e.g., freedom of movement in the European
Union) and not recognized where they work against the person (e.g.,
additional protections accruing to stateless persons under the
Statelessness Convention). Even if unlawful deprivation of nationality
is unlawful, states can still recognize the case as the creation of
statelessness, 230 while treating the individual as if he or she had a

226. See id., para. 124
227. See id., para. 123
228. See id., para. 122
229. See id., para. 125
230. See U.N.H.C.R., Expert Meeting, The Concept of Stateless Persons under
International Law, para. 18 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L43D-68XM].
[W]here a deprivation of nationality may be contrary to rules of international law, this
illegality is not relevant in determining whether the person is [stateless] . . . The
alternative approach would lead to outcomes contrary to the ordinary meaning of the
terms [on statelessness] . . . This does not, however, prejudice any obligation that
States may have not to recognize such situations as legal where the illegality relates
to a violation of jus cogens norms.
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nationality for other purposes, 231 because a statelessness determination
examines the factual situation, not the method of loss of nationality. 232
One final thought on this matter is that the underlying reasoning
of Nottebohm might permit a state to recognize EU citizenship even
without the need to resort to ex injuria jus non oritur. In Nottebohm,
the ICJ held that states are not required to recognize the nationality of
other states when the grant of nationality is not in compliance with
international law, which requires a “genuine link.” 233 Actually, the
Court held that all public acts of a state, including the grant of
nationality among others, cannot demand unquestioning recognition,
when contrary to international law. 234 If an EU Member State
determined that such an unlawful act by a sister Member State occurred
and decided to treat the individual as if he had EU citizenship, then this
act should be permissible.
The possibility to refuse to recognize other Member State acts
does not violate existing EU law. The situation is fundamentally
different from Rottmann and Micheletti where the duty of sincere
cooperation within the European Union requires states to give effect
other state’s acts. Rottmann was concerned with the revocation of
Member State nationality and the impact on EU citizenship.235
Micheletti was focused on the refusal to recognize another Member
State’s nationality with serious negative implications for EU
citizenship. 236 This proposal in this article is quite different; it concerns
the refusal to recognize a Member State’s denial of nationality, in favor
of EU citizenship for the individual. This situation does not raise the
same implications for EU citizenship and sincere cooperation that the
denials of EU citizenship in Rottmann and Micheletti did, because it
protects EU citizenship from wrongful denial. Thus, this proposal is in
alignment with Rottmann and Micheletti.
Finally, the obligation to refuse to recognize an unlawful denial
of nationality applies to all states. In the Namibia opinion, the ICJ
concluded that the obligation of nonrecognition applies to all states in
the world, not only to UN Member States. 237 While this might be based
231. See FAM, supra note 223, at 41.104, 41.113; Crawford, supra note 221, at 31. See
also Caglar v. Billingham, supra note 223, at 151.
232. U.N.H.C.R., supra note 218, at 4 para. 20
233. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 23.
234. See id.
235. Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 42-5, 55-56.
236. Id.
237. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 126.
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on the special nature of the United Nations, the Court does not
articulate it as such. For this reason, the obligation to recognize
constructive EU citizenship applies equally to states that are not
members of the European Union as it does to EU Member States. While
other EU Member State may have more obvious obligations such as
respecting free movement and providing for participation in EU
parliamentary elections, non-EU states will need to give certain
benefits to the individuals as part of their EU citizenship. For example,
to the degree to which other states have accepted the right of any EU
Member State’s mission to exercise diplomatic assistance and to
protect any EU citizen, such practice should be respected for
constructive EU citizens. There may also be other benefits for travel
visas, scholarship funding, and so on, available in third states to EU
citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has concluded that the unlawful revocation or refusal
of Member State nationality cannot have a legal effect within the EU
legal order and that an individual should have his or her EU citizenship
recognized by other states, despite the denial of Member State
nationality. An individual acquires EU citizenship when he or she holds
Member State nationality. While the acquisition of EU citizenship is
dependent on Member State nationality, EU citizenship is largely
independent of Member State nationality for other purposes. This dual
nature is in keeping with EU citizenship being a person’s fundamental
legal status within the Union, placing that person into a direct legal
bond with the Union.
Because the acquisition of EU citizenship is dependent upon the
acquisition of Member State nationality, the nationality laws of the
Member State are critical. The Member States retain considerable
discretion in determining which persons are eligible for acquisition and
retention of nationality. But this discretion is not unlimited. For
example, Member States are not free to impose discriminatory rules for
the acquisition of their nationality. Such a rule would, in effect, mean
that the Union had adopted discriminatory rules for the acquisition of
EU citizenship, through the instrumentality of the Member State.
Clearly, international and European human rights law would prohibit
such a practice. Discrimination is only one limitation and other
limitations include protections from statelessness and the arbitrary
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revocation of nationality, as well as the protection of other human
rights, such as the right to an identity.
This Article has examined the impact on EU citizenship when a
Member State persists in imposing unlawful nationality laws. EU law
requires states to act with sincere cooperation in implementing their EU
obligations, including adopting nationality laws. While Member States
may be prohibited under law from adopting certain nationality
measures, those laws may not necessarily have domestic effect. In such
cases, other Member States, and the Union itself, should not be required
to recognize the unlawful act. The ability to refuse recognition of
unlawful acts has a long pedigree in international law and states have
exercised this right for any violation of international law, not only jus
cogens obligations. There is a possibility for interpreting the TFEU to
grant EU citizenship despite the unlawful denial of Member State
nationality, and the duty of sincere cooperation does not otherwise
require Member States to recognize a denial of nationality. Therefore,
the other Member States and the Union itself will be under a duty to
refuse legal effect to the unlawful act, a duty that EU law will not
excuse. The consequence will be that the other Member States and the
Union will recognize an individual as having de jure EU citizenship
notwithstanding the lack of de facto Member State nationality.
There are several ways in which this practice might arise. One
possibility is that, following the denial of Member State nationality, the
individual could request a referral to the CJEU. Similarly, if the
individual was physically in a different EU Member State and applied
for rights deriving from his or her claim to EU citizenship, then he or
she could appeal the denial, and, again, request a referral to the CJEU
if necessary. Of course, either one of these processes could be
abbreviated if the Member State resolved the question of EU
citizenship at a lower appellate level. Yet another possible scenario is
for a claimant to EU citizenship to apply directly to the Union for some
exercise of EU citizenship rights, such as EU civil servant employment,
and request the Union to recognize his or her EU citizenship despite
the Member State refusing nationality. Obviously, this practice may
cause some logistical difficulties, such as establishing EU citizenship
without possessing a Member State passport, but these are merely
evidentiary complications. This author has previously argued that the
Union should take the step of documenting EU citizenship separately
from Member State nationality, in keeping with its distinct fundamental
status, and this article argues in favor of that practice again.
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In summary, while EU Member States serve as gatekeepers to EU
citizenship by exercising their nationality laws, they may not impose
nationality laws that are unlawful. Such unlawful acts cannot have
lawful consequences. Not only does the Member State violate
European and international law in doing so, but the recognition of its
unlawful act would implicate the other Member States and the Union.
Those other actors are bound by international law to refuse to recognize
unlawful acts as having lawful consequences, so they would violate
international law to act otherwise. In addition, in so far as the
recognition of the unlawful nationality refusal must be given effect
within the other Member States and Union legal order, those other
actors would be violating other primary rules of international law. All
of these arguments force us to conclude that, should an EU Member
State unlawfully deny any person its nationality, and thus EU
citizenship, the other EU Member States and the Union must
nonetheless give effect to EU citizenship.

